

# DEFENDING DATA PRIVACY CLASS ACTION LITIGATION

Excerpted from page proofs for the 2017 update for Chapter 26 (Data Privacy) of  
*E-Commerce and Internet Law: A Legal Treatise With Forms, Second Edition*,  
a 4-volume legal treatise by Ian C. Ballon (Thomson/West Publishing 2016)

## CYBER BOOT CAMP: DATA SECURITY AT THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND BUSINESS DAILY JOURNAL LOS ANGELES, CA JANUARY 12, 2017

**Ian C. Ballon**  
**Greenberg Traurig, LLP**

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <b>Los Angeles:</b><br><b>1840 Century Park East, Ste. 1900</b><br><b>Los Angeles, CA 90067</b><br><b>Direct Dial: (310) 586-6575</b><br><b>Direct Fax: (310) 586-0575</b> | <b>Silicon Valley:</b><br><b>1900 University Avenue, 5th Fl.</b><br><b>East Palo Alto, CA 914303</b><br><b>Direct Dial: (650) 289-7881</b><br><b>Direct Fax: (650) 462-7881</b> |
|--|---|

[Ballon@gtlaw.com](mailto:Ballon@gtlaw.com)

<[www.ianballon.net](http://www.ianballon.net)>

**LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, Google+: IanBallon**

This paper has been excerpted from page proofs for the 2017 updates for *E-Commerce and Internet Law: Treatise with Forms 2d Edition* (Thomson West 2016 Annual Update), a 4-volume legal treatise by Ian C. Ballon, published by West LegalWorks Publishing, 395 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014, (212) 337-8443, [www.ianballon.net](http://www.ianballon.net).



**Ian C. Ballon**

Shareholder

Internet, Intellectual Property & Technology Litigation

Admitted: California, District of Columbia and Maryland  
Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth and Federal Circuits  
U.S. Supreme Court  
JD, LL.M., CIPP

Ballon@gtlaw.com

LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, Google+: Ian Ballon

**Los Angeles**

1840 Century Park East  
Los Angeles, CA 90067  
T 310.586.6575  
F 310.586.0575

**Silicon Valley**

1900 University Avenue  
5th Floor  
East Palo Alto, CA 94303  
T 650.289.7881  
F 650.462.7881

Ian C. Ballon is Co-Chair of Greenberg Traurig LLP's Global Intellectual Property & Technology Practice Group and represents internet, mobile, entertainment and technology companies in defending data privacy, security breach and TCPA class action suits and in other intellectual property and technology litigation. A list of recent cases may be found at <http://www.gtlaw.com/People/Ian-C-Ballon>.

He is also the author of the leading treatise on internet and mobile law, *E-Commerce and Internet Law: Treatise with Forms 2d edition*, the 4-volume set published by West ([www.lanBallon.net](http://www.lanBallon.net)), which includes extensive coverage of security breach and data privacy issues. In addition, he is the author of *The Complete CAN-SPAM Act Handbook* (West 2008) and *The Complete State Security Breach Notification Compliance Handbook* (West 2009). He also serves as Executive Director of Stanford University Law School's Center for E-Commerce, which hosts the annual Best Practices Conference where lawyers, scholars and judges are regularly featured and interact.

Ian was named the Lawyer of the Year for Information Technology Law in the 2016 and 2013 editions of Best Lawyers in America and was recognized as the 2012 [New Media Lawyer of the Year](#) by the Century City Bar Association. In 2010, he was the recipient of the California State Bar Intellectual Property Law section's Vanguard Award for significant contributions to the development of intellectual property law (<http://ipsection.calbar.ca.gov/IntellectualPropertyLaw/IPVanguardAwards.aspx>). Mr. Ballon was listed in *Variety's* "Legal Impact Report: 50 Game-Changing Attorneys" and has been named by the *LA Daily Journal* as one of the Top 75 intellectual property litigators in California in every year that the list has been published (2009 through 2016) and as one of the top 100 lawyers in California. He is also listed in Legal 500 U.S., The Best Lawyers in America (in the areas of information technology and intellectual property) and Chambers and Partners USA Guide in the areas of privacy and data security and information technology. Mr. Ballon also holds the CIPP/US certification from the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP).

personally identifying information is to be transferred to third parties)?<sup>39</sup>

- Have adequate procedures been put in place to conduct periodic privacy and security audits to ensure the continued accuracy of the policy (and make appropriate adjustments or revisions over time)?
- What internal mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that the policy is revised as practices change? Will the Legal Department receive notice when new marketing, business practices or technologies are implemented?

### 26.15 Class Action Litigation

Since 2010, there has been an explosion of data privacy-related putative class action suits filed against Internet companies, social networks, social gaming sites, advertising companies, application providers, mobile device distributors, and companies that (regardless of the nature of their business) merely advertise on the Internet, among others. While data privacy class actions have been brought since the 1990s, the dramatic increase in suits filed beginning in 2010 largely results from increased attention given to data privacy in Washington during the early years of the Obama Administration, including Congressional hearings and talk of potential consumer privacy legislation, the FTC's ongoing focus on behavioral advertising, and publicity about the settlement of two high profile putative class action suits where defendants paid large sums at the very outset of each case without engaging in significant litigation. All of these developments, in turn, have created greater press attention and consumer awareness of privacy issues.

Businesses potentially risk being sued if they engage in practices that are at variance with their stated privacy policies or in the event of a security breach that results in the disclosure of personally identifying information where liability for the breach can be established.<sup>1</sup>

Increasingly, however, lawsuits are brought challenging

---

<sup>39</sup>See *supra* § 26.13[6].

#### [Section 26.15]

<sup>1</sup>Security breach class action suits are separately analyzed in section 27.07.

the use of new technologies or business models or for online advertising practices. Putative privacy class action suits also often are filed following FTC investigations or news reports of alleged violations or even blog reports about new product features.

Many businesses opt to settle putative class action suits—regardless of the merits—because the cost of settling often is less than the cost of litigation or to avoid adverse publicity. For a consumer-oriented company, constant press reports and blog posts about litigation alleging privacy violations may be damaging to its business. Some class action lawyers exploit this fact by issuing press releases or giving interviews or speeches designed to maximize the impact of adverse publicity and try to force a settlement. A quick settlement may resolve the problem of bad publicity, but also may identify a company as a prime target for future cases. Some businesses believe that if they are willing to fight on the merits they may be less likely targets when the next round of potential cases are filed. Ultimately, many factors influence a company's decision to either litigate or settle a case.

Earlier waves of Internet privacy litigation had largely proven unfruitful for plaintiffs' lawyers because of the absence of any monetary injury and the difficulty of framing alleged Internet privacy violations into computer crime statutes largely concerned with protecting the security of networks and systems from hackers, rather than specifically user privacy, as underscored by early litigation over the alleged collection of user information in cookie files<sup>2</sup> and in suits against airline companies for allegedly sharing pas-

---

<sup>2</sup>See, e.g., *Chance v. Avenue A, Inc.*, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying as moot plaintiffs' motion for class certification in a case arising out of defendants' alleged placement of cookies on user computers and tracking their activity; granting summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims under (1) the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim, because the minimum \$5,000 damage requirement could not be met; (2) the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701 *et seq.*, because in light of the technological and commercial relationship between users and the defendant's website, it was implausible to suggest that "access" was not intended or authorized; and (3) the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510 *et seq.*, based on the finding that it was implicit in the code instructing users' computers to contact the website that consent had been obtained to the alleged interception of communications between users and defendants); *In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice claims arising out of DoubleClick's proposed plan to allow participating websites to exchange cookie files obtained by users

senger data.<sup>3</sup>

A decade later, cases began to focus on the alleged disclosure of information through the use of social networks,

---

to better target banner advertisements because, among other things, defendant's affiliated websites were the relevant "users" of internet access under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), submissions containing personal data made by users to defendant's affiliated websites were intended for those websites, and therefore the sites' authorization was sufficient to grant defendant's access under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(c)(2)); *In re Intuit Privacy Litig.*, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (dismissing with leave to amend claims under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 arising out of the alleged collection of information in cookie files because plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege a tortious or criminal purpose or that they had suffered damage or loss, but denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701 for intentionally accessing electronically stored data); *see also, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 292 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003) (granting summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiffs' ECPA claim over the alleged collection of data from cookie files, based on the lack of evidence of intent). *But see In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litig.*, No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim in a case alleging the collection of information from cookie files and granting leave for plaintiffs to amend their complaint to assert a Wiretap Act claim); *see also In re Apple & AT & TM Antitrust Litig.*, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (following *Toys R Us* in permitting plaintiffs to aggregate their individual damages under the CFAA to reach the \$5,000 threshold).

<sup>3</sup>*See, e.g., In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig.*, 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing a suit brought on behalf of airline passengers alleging that JetBlue had transferred personal information about them to a data mining company, holding that the airline's online reservation system did not constitute an "electronic communication service" within the meaning of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the airline was not a "remote computing service" under the Act merely because it operated a website and computer servers); *In re American Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 370 F. Supp. 2d 552 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (dismissing a putative class action suit brought over American's allegedly unauthorized disclosure of its passengers' personally identifiable travel information to the Transport Safety Administration and its subsequent disclosure of that information to private research companies because the alleged disclosures did not violate ECPA, plaintiffs could not state a claim for breach of contract and plaintiffs' other state law claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1)); *Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp.*, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D. 2004) (dismissing putative class action claims of passengers who alleged that the airline's unauthorized disclosure of their personal information to the government violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and constituted breach of contract where the court held that the airline was not an "electronic communications service provider" within the meaning of the Act and the airline's privacy policy did not constitute a contract).

behavioral advertising, mobile phone applications and other web 2.0 technologies, and cloud computing applications, although these cases often suffer from similar defects (at least under federal statutes).<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>See, e.g., *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' federal Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claims and claims for violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), California Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), the California Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), and the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (Cal. Penal Code § 502), but holding that plaintiffs stated claims under the California Constitution and California tort law); *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 572 F. App'x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming in part, reversing in part dismissal of claims arising out of the alleged transmission of personal information about users from a social network to third party advertisers); *In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs' Wiretap, SCA and related claims premised on the alleged disclosure of browsing history via cookies); *Svenson v. Google Inc.*, No. 13-cv-04080-BLF, 2015 WL 1503429 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015) (dismissing claims under the Stored Communications Act over alleged sharing of users' personal information with app vendors, but allowing breach of contract, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and unfair competition claims to proceed); *Opperman v. Path, Inc.*, 84 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting in part, denying in part defendants' motion to dismiss relating to the transfer of data from user's mobile address books to defendants when users selected the "Find Friends" feature to connect with friends on social networks); *Campbell v. Facebook, Inc.*, 77 F. Supp. 3d 836 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss ECPA and CIPA claims, but dismissing plaintiffs' UCL claim); *In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation*, 58 F. Supp. 3d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' CLRA and intrusion upon seclusion claims against Google for allegedly disclosing user data to third parties, but allowing claims for breach of contract and fraudulent business practices under the UCL to proceed); *Opperman v. Path, Inc.*, Case No. 13-CV-00453-JST, 2014 WL 1973378 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims against all defendants with leave to amend, with the exception of the claim for common law intrusion upon seclusion; plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's apps had been surreptitiously accessing and disseminating contact information stored by customers on Apple devices); *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2014 WL 988833 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's privacy claim under the California Constitution but denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract claim premised on Pandora's alleged breach of its privacy policy and plaintiffs' UCL claims); *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing with leave to amend a putative class action suit for Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and state unfair competition, unjust enrichment and trespass claims based on the alleged use of browser and flash cookies); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, Case No. 11-MD-02250-

In 2010, for example, a number of suits were brought alleging that flash cookies<sup>5</sup> were being used to “re-spawn” data that had been removed by users when they deleted their browser cookies, which was a practice that the defendants in these suits denied engaging in. While the first round of cases settled early on terms that provided broad releases as part of a class action settlement,<sup>6</sup> subsequent claims were dismissed on the merits in 2011.<sup>7</sup>

Data privacy cases based on behavioral advertising, information voluntarily disclosed by users in social networking profiles or to app providers or other practices related to cloud

---

LHK, 2011 WL 4403963 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (dismissing for lack of Article III standing, with leave to amend, a putative class action suit against Apple and various application providers alleging misuse of personal information without consent); *Bose v. Interclick, Inc.*, No. 10 Civ. 9183, 2011 WL 4343517 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011) (dismissing with prejudice all claims against the advertising defendants and CFAA and most other claims against the remaining defendant in a suit alleging the use of flash cookies and browser sniffing); *LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc.*, No. SACV 10-1256-GW (JCGx), 2011 WL 1661532 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (dismissing with leave to amend a putative class action suit brought over the alleged use of flash cookies to store a user’s browsing history).

<sup>5</sup>In contrast to browser cookies, flash cookies may be used in conjunction with flash media players to record information such as a user’s volume preference, as a persistent identifier or for other purposes. *See supra* § 26.03.

<sup>6</sup>The first suits, brought primarily against Internet advertising companies Quantcast and Clearspring and their alleged advertiser customers, were consolidated and settled for \$2.4 million and an injunction against Quantcast and Clearspring, and broad releases to all downstream advertisers and websites on which Quantcast or Clearspring widgets had been placed. *See In re Quantcast Advertising Cookie Litig.*, Case No. CV 10-5484-GW (JCGx) (C.D. Cal. Final Order and Judgment entered June 13, 2011); *In re Clearspring Flash Cookie Litig.*, Case No. CV 10-5948-GW (JCGx) (C.D. Cal. Final Order and Judgment entered June 13, 2011).

<sup>7</sup>*See Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing with leave to amend a putative class action suit for Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and state unfair competition, unjust enrichment and trespass claims based on the alleged use of browser and flash cookies); *Bose v. Interclick, Inc.*, No. 10 Civ. 9183, 2011 WL 4343517 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011) (dismissing with prejudice all claims against the advertising defendants and most claims against the remaining defendant in a suit alleging the use of flash cookies and browser sniffing); *LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc.*, No. SACV 10-1256-GW (JCGx), 2011 WL 1661532 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (dismissing with leave to amend a putative class action suit brought over the alleged use of flash cookies to store a user’s browsing history). The *Specific Media* case ultimately was dismissed by the plaintiff.

computing generally involve, at most, theoretical violations where no injury has occurred.

In a typical behavioral advertising suit, for example, if the plaintiffs' assertions are correct, at most, users might have been shown an advertisement potentially of interest to the user based on the websites accessed by a computer's browser, as opposed to an advertisement for herbal Viagra substitutes, unaccredited universities or other ads of no interest to most users. In either case, the user was free to disregard the advertisement, which typically is displayed on sites that offer free content.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, in either case, the advertiser and ad agency generally would not know the identity of the user—only the persistent identifiers associated with a given computer (which could be used by a single person or multiple people).

Putative privacy class action suits often are filed in waves—as class action lawyers focus on new federal or state statutes, technologies, or business practices.

Plaintiffs' counsel typically try to sue under statutes that authorize prevailing parties to recover statutory damages and attorneys' fees, since actual damages typically are *de minimis* or non-existent in most of these cases. Consequently, suits often are brought in federal court under federal statutes that provide for statutory damages or attorneys' fee awards (or both), where it also may be easier for plaintiffs' class action lawyers to justify larger settlements based on nation-wide classes.<sup>9</sup> Putative data privacy class action suits have been brought under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),<sup>10</sup> which in Title I (also known as the Wiretap Act) proscribes the intentional *interception* of

---

<sup>8</sup>Data privacy cases increasingly challenge advertising practices that in many respects are not much different from the way that television viewers are shown advertisements based on what the advertiser assumes to be the interests of the demographic group likely to be watching a particular program. Whether the advertiser is correct—and a user is interested in lip gloss rather than laxatives, for example—implicates “injuries,” if any, that are at most *de minimis*. The fact that a user might have been shown an ad that he or she was free to ignore but which might have been of interest is not the sort of “violation” which typically is compensable. See Ian C. Ballon & Wendy Mantell, *Suing Over Data Privacy and Behavioral Advertising*, ABA Class Actions, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Summer 2011).

<sup>9</sup>State courts generally certify class actions involving state residents.

<sup>10</sup>18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510 to 2521 (Title I), 2701 to 2711 (Title II); *supra*

electronic communications and in Title II (also known as the Stored Communications Act) prohibits unauthorized, intentional *access* to stored information. Plaintiffs also have sued under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,<sup>11</sup> which like ECPA, is largely an anti-hacking statute. Suits also have been brought under the Video Privacy Protection Act.<sup>12</sup> Claims additionally may be asserted under state law for breach of contract based on alleged breach of privacy policies and terms of use, under state computer crime statutes, for common law privacy claims or for unfair competition, where plaintiffs assert supplemental jurisdiction or jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)<sup>13</sup> as the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. In the absence of injury or damage, however, many of these cases may not survive in federal court because injury typically is required to establish standing and is an element of many potential claims.

To have standing to sue in federal court under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” which must be (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”<sup>14</sup> To establish injury in fact, “allegations of

---

§ 26.09; *see generally infra* §§ 44.06, 44.07, 47.01, 50.06[4], 58.06[3].

<sup>11</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 1030; *supra* § 26.09; *see generally infra* § 44.08.

<sup>12</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2710; *see generally supra* § 26.13[10].

<sup>13</sup>28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d).

<sup>14</sup>*Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). The Constitution limits the judicial power of the federal courts to actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. A case or controversy exists only when the party asserting federal jurisdiction can show “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends.” *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Absent Article III standing, there is no “case or controversy” and a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment*, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998); *see also Whitmore v. Arkansas*, 495 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1990) (“Article III . . . gives the federal courts jurisdiction over only ‘cases and controversies.’”).

For common law claims, the only standing requirement is that imposed by Article III of the Constitution. “When a plaintiff alleges injury to rights conferred by a statute, two separate standing-related inquiries pertain: whether the plaintiff has Article III standing (constitutional standing) and whether the statute gives that plaintiff authority to sue (statutory standing).” *Katz v. Pershing, LLC*, 672 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2012), *citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment*, 523 U.S. 83,

possible future injury are not sufficient.”<sup>15</sup> The threatened injury must be “certainly impending. . . .”<sup>16</sup> In addition to showing injury in fact, (1) a plaintiff must establish that there is “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” (specifically, “the injury has to be fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court”) and (2) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”<sup>17</sup> In short, standing depends on a showing of injury in fact, causation and redressability.<sup>18</sup> Where standing cannot be established, a putative class action suit will be dismissed.

Standing must be established based on the named plaintiffs that actually filed suit, not unnamed putative class members.<sup>19</sup>

---

89, 92 (1998). Article III standing presents a question of justiciability; if it is lacking, a federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. *Id.* By contrast, statutory standing goes to the merits of the claim. *See Bond v. United States*, 564 U.S. 211, 218-19 (2011).

<sup>15</sup>*Clapper v. Amnesty International USA*, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

<sup>16</sup>*Clapper v. Amnesty International USA*, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146-47 (2013); *see generally infra* § 27.07 (analyzing *Clapper* in connection with security breach putative class action suits); *see also infra* § 27.07 (analyzing *Clapper* and discussing standing in the context of data security suits).

<sup>17</sup>*Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted); *see also Clapper v. Amnesty International USA*, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (“To establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’”; *quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561 U.S. 139, 149-50 (2010)); *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (applying the same standard as *Lujan*).

<sup>18</sup>*Katz v. Pershing, LLC*, 672 F.3d 64, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining *Lujan*).

<sup>19</sup>*See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.*, 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“That a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.’”; *quoting Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975)); *see also O’Shea v. Littleton*, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (“if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants,

A number of privacy-related putative class action suits have been dismissed for lack of standing. In many cases—particularly those involving alleged user tracking and behavioral advertising practices<sup>20</sup> the failure to provide no-

---

none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.”); *Payton v. County of Kane*, 308 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Standing cannot be acquired through the back door of a class action.” (internal quotation omitted)); see also *Easter v. American West Financial*, 381 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a court must first evaluate the standing of named plaintiffs before determining whether a class may be certified).

<sup>20</sup>See, e.g., *In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 931-34 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint where their allegation of a secondary market for data wasn’t coupled with any assertion that plaintiffs have been unable to participate in that market as a result of the defendant’s alleged practices); *In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig.*, No. 11-MD-02264, 2013 WL 1283236, at \*3-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (rejecting diminution in the value of plaintiffs’ PII, diminished battery capacity, overpayment or costs incurred as grounds to show injury-in-fact to sustain Article III standing, but holding plaintiffs had standing to assert a claim under the California Constitution and for statutory violations); *Gaos v. Google Inc.*, No. 5:10-CV-4809 EJD, 2012 WL 1094646 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, public disclosure of private facts, actual and constructive fraud, breach of contract and unjust enrichment, for lack of standing, with leave to amend, in a putative class action suit based on the defendant’s alleged practice of including the search terms employed by a user in the URL for the search results page displayed in response to a search query, allegedly causing that information to be visible to advertisers in the referer header when a user clicks on an advertiser’s link from the results page, but denying the motion with respect to plaintiffs’ Stored Communications Act claim); *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, No. 11-cv-01468-LHK, 2011 WL 5509848, at \*3-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, for lack of standing, with leave to amend, a putative privacy class action suit based on alleged privacy violations stemming from the alleged disclosure of personally identifiable browsing history to third party advertising and marketing companies where plaintiff was unable to articulate what information of his, aside from his user identification number, had actually been transmitted to third parties, or how disclosure of his anonymous user ID could be linked to his personal identity); *Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.*, No. C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ statutory right of publicity claims over the use of the names and likenesses of non-celebrity private individuals without compensation or consent in connection with Facebook’s “Friend Finder” tool, for failing to allege injury sufficient to support standing, where plaintiffs could not allege that their names and likenesses had any general commercial value and did not allege that they suffered any distress, hurt feelings, or other emotional harm); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, Case No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011)

tice<sup>21</sup> or other alleged privacy violations<sup>22</sup>—there simply has

---

(dismissing for lack of Article III standing, with leave to amend, a putative class action suit against Apple and various application providers alleging misuse of personal information without consent); *Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.*, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing California common law and statutory right of publicity, California unfair competition and Lanham Act claims for lack of injury, with leave to amend, in a putative privacy class action suit based on Facebook’s use of a person’s name and likeness to alert their Facebook friends that they had used Facebook’s “Friend Finder” tool, allegedly creating an implied endorsement); *LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc.*, No. SACV 10-1256-GW (JCGx), 2011 WL 1661532 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (dismissing a putative class action suit brought over the alleged use of flash cookies to store a user’s browsing history).

<sup>21</sup>See, e.g., *Murray v. Time Inc.*, No. C 12-00431 JSW, 2012 WL 3634387 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (dismissing, with leave to amend, plaintiff’s claims under Cal Civil Code § 1798.83 and Cal. Bus. & Professions Code § 17200 for lack of statutory standing due to lack injury and dismissing plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief for lack of Article III standing), *aff’d mem.*, 554 F. App’x 654 (9th Cir. 2014); see generally *supra* § 26.13[6][D] (analyzing section 1798.83 and cases construing it).

<sup>22</sup>See, e.g., *McCullough v. Smarte Carte, Inc.*, Case No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108, at \*3-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff’s putative Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act class action suit for lack of Article III and statutory standing where the plaintiff alleged that Smarte Carte retained her fingerprint biometric information without written consent, where Smarte Carte used a person’s fingerprints to allow them to access a rented locker, because “[e]ven without prior written consent to retain, if Smarte Carte did indeed retain the fingerprint data beyond the rental period, the Court finds it difficult to imagine, without more, how this retention could work a concrete harm” and she could not establish that she was “aggrieved by” the alleged violation, to establish statutory standing); *Carlsen v. Gamestop, Inc.*, Civil No. 14-3131, 2015 WL 3538906 (D. Minn. June 4, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s putative class action suit with prejudice where plaintiff alleged that Game Informer Magazine shared his PII with Facebook whenever users employed Facebook’s Like, Share or Comment functions on Game Informer’s website, because plaintiff could not establish standing based on allegations that he had overpaid for his subscription or would not have purchased it at all had he known what Gamestop’s actual privacy practices were); *Frezza v. Google Inc.*, No. 5:12-cv-00237, 2013 WL 1736788 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) (dismissing claims for breach of contract and breach of implied contract over Google’s alleged failure to implement Data Security Standards (DSS) rules in connection with promotions for Google Tags; distinguishing cases where courts found standing involving the disclosure of personal information, as opposed to mere retention of data, as in *Frezza*); *In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig.*, No. C 12-01382 PSG, 2012 WL 6738343 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (dismissing claims arising out of Google’s new privacy policy where plaintiffs alleged injury based on the cost of replacing their Android phones “to escape the burden imposed by Google’s new policy” but in fact could not allege that they had ever purchased a replacement mobile

been no injury from the complained of activity. Even in security breach cases, standing may be an issue if there has been no allegation of injury (although there presently is a split of authority over whether the mere apprehension of future injury is sufficient to establish standing in a case where there has been a security breach but no actual identity theft or other adverse use of the information).<sup>23</sup>

---

phone and where plaintiffs could not state a claim for a violation of the Wiretap Act; relying in part on *Birdsong v. Apple, Inc.*, 590 F.3d 955, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing for lack of standing a putative class action suit brought by iPod users who claimed that they suffered or imminently would suffer hearing loss because of the iPod’s capacity to produce sound as loud as 120 decibels, where plaintiffs at most could claim a risk of future injury to others and therefore could not allege an injury concrete and particularized to themselves)).

<sup>23</sup>*Compare, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.*, 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal for lack of standing and failure to state a claim, noting that particularly “[i]n data breach cases where no misuse is alleged, . . . there has been no injury,” and that “[a]ny damages that may occur here are entirely speculative and dependent on the skill and intent of the hacker.”), *cert. denied*, 132 S. Ct. 2395 (2012); *In re Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data that Theft Litigation*, 45 F. Supp. 2d 14, (D.D.C. 2014) (granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims arising out of a government data breach; holding, (1) the risk of identity theft alone was insufficient to constitute “injury in fact” for purposes of standing; (2) invasion of privacy alone was insufficient to constitute “injury in fact” for purposes of standing; (3) allegations that victims lost personal and medical information was too speculative to constitute “injury in fact” for purposes of standing; (4) mere allegations that unauthorized charges were made to victims’ credit cards or debit cards following theft of data failed to show causation; (5) plaintiffs’ claim that victims received a number of unsolicited calls from telemarketers and scam artists following data breach did not suffice to show causation, as required for standing; but (6) allegations that a victim received letters in the mail from credit card companies thanking him for applying for a loan were sufficient to demonstrate causation; and (7) allegations that a victim received unsolicited telephone calls on her unlisted number from insurance companies and others targeted at her specific, undisclosed medical condition were sufficient to demonstrate causation); *In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig.*, 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092-95 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs’ putative class action suit arising out of a hacker gaining access to their LinkedIn passwords and email addresses, for lack of Article III standing, where plaintiffs alleged no injury or damage); *with Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.*, \_ F. App’x \_, 2016 WL 4728027 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding, by a 2-1 decision in an unreported opinion, that the plaintiffs had standing to sue); *Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC*, 794 F.3d 688, 695 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to sue in a data breach case, even though they had not been victims of identity theft); *see generally infra* § 27.07 (analyz-

Where standing has been found in putative data privacy class action suits, it has been because a plaintiff can show entitlement to monetary damages<sup>24</sup> or, where sensitive personal data has been compromised, based on the risk of future identity theft, where this theory has been applied.<sup>25</sup> Less commonly, Article III standing also may be established based on invasion of a constitutional right.<sup>26</sup>

---

ing standing in putative data security breach class action suits).

<sup>24</sup>See, e.g., *Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring common law right of publicity, UCL, and section 502 causes of action because an individual's name has economic value where the name is used to endorse or advertise a product to the individual's friends and contacts); *In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litigation*, Case No. 5:12-CV-03088-EJD, 2014 WL 1323713 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) (holding that plaintiff had sufficiently established standing under Article III and the UCL because she alleged that she purchased her premium subscription in reliance on LinkedIn's alleged misrepresentation about the security of user data); *Fraleley v. Facebook, Inc.*, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring a class action suit where they alleged entitlement to compensation under California law based on Facebook's alleged practice of placing members' names, pictures and the assertion that they had "liked" certain advertisers on other members pages, which plaintiffs alleged constituted a right of publicity violation, unfair competition and unjust enrichment).

<sup>25</sup>See, e.g., *Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC*, 794 F.3d 688, 695 (7th Cir. 2015) (security breach where some members of the putative class had already been the victims of identity theft); *Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.*, 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (suit for negligence and breach of contract by employees who had had their personal information, including names, addresses, and social security numbers, compromised as a result of the theft of a company laptop); *In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Security Breach Litigation*, 996 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' allegations that defendants failed to provide reasonable network security, including utilizing industry-standard encryption, to safeguard plaintiffs' personal and financial information stored on defendants' network; finding that plaintiffs had sufficiently established Article III standing by plausibly alleging a "credible threat" of impending harm based on the disclosure of their personal information following the intrusion); see generally *infra* § 27.07 (analyzing standing in data security putative class action cases). As noted earlier in this section, there is a significant split of authority on how courts view standing in security breach cases where information has been exposed but the only harm is apprehension of future identity theft. See generally *infra* § 27.07.

<sup>26</sup>See, e.g., *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*3-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (holding that plaintiff in a putative data privacy class action suit had standing based on an unspecified violation of his constitutional rights, while rejecting theories of

Previously, standing also was found in a number of data privacy cases based merely on a plaintiff's ability to state a claim under a federal<sup>27</sup> or even state<sup>28</sup> statute that did not require a showing of damage or injury, in light of a circuit split that ultimately was resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court

---

standing based on the alleged diminution of the value of his PII, decrease in memory space resulting from use of Pandora's app and future harm).

<sup>27</sup>See, e.g., *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding, after earlier dismissing plaintiffs' original complaint for lack of standing, that plaintiffs had standing to assert Stored Communications Act and California Constitutional Right of Privacy claims, as alleged in their amended complaint, but dismissing those claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1053–55 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs established injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing by alleging a violation of their statutory rights under the Wiretap Act); *In re Hulu Privacy Litig.*, No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 WL 2119193, at \*8 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) (holding that plaintiffs "establish[ed] an injury (and standing) by alleging a violation of [the Video Privacy Protection Act]"); *Gaos v. Google Inc.*, No. 5:10-CV-4809 EJD, 2012 WL 1094646 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (denying defendant's motion with respect to plaintiffs' Stored Communications Act claim, finding a violation of statutory rights to be a concrete injury, while dismissing claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, public disclosure of private facts, actual and constructive fraud, breach of contract and unjust enrichment in a putative class action suit, for lack of standing, with leave to amend, based on the defendant's alleged practice of including the search terms employed by a user in the URL for the search results page displayed in response to a search query, allegedly causing that information to be visible to advertisers in the referer header when a user clicks on an advertiser's link from the results page); *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (granting in part defendant's motion to dismiss but finding Article III standing in a case where the plaintiffs alleged that a social network transferred data to advertisers without their consent because the Wiretap Act creates a private right of action for any person whose electronic communication is "intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used," and does not require any further injury), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part, on other grounds*, 572 F. App'x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' UCL claim but reversing dismissal of their breach of contract and fraud claims).

<sup>28</sup>See *In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig.*, Case No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at \*17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (denying Google's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for a violation of California's anti-wiretapping and anti-eavesdropping statute, Cal. Penal Code § 630, based on Google's alleged automatic scanning of Gmail messages for keywords for the purpose of displaying relevant advertising); see also *In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation*, Case No. 5:13-MD-2430-LHK, 2014 WL 294441 (N.D. Cal. Jan 27, 2014) (denying the defendant's motion to certify the opinion for interlocutory appeal).

in 2016,<sup>29</sup> but which prior to that time had made federal courts in California favored venues for data privacy cases because of the Ninth Circuit's liberal view of standing (and the perception that California law and juries tend to favor plaintiffs).<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup>See *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).

<sup>30</sup>Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), courts in the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits found standing where a plaintiff could state a claim for violation of a statute, even where the statute did not require a showing of injury or harm and the plaintiff could not allege injury or harm apart from the alleged statutory breach, but courts in the Fourth and Federal Circuits found no standing in such cases absent a separate allegation of injury-in-fact. See generally *infra* § 27.07 (analyzing standing in the context of data security cases and discussing the circuit split that existed prior to *Spokeo*).

In *Edwards v. First American Corp.*, 610 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012), the Ninth Circuit had held that a plaintiff had standing to sue a title insurer under the anti-kickback provisions of Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2607, regardless of whether she was overcharged for settlement services, because the statute did not limit liability to instances in which a plaintiff was overcharged. Another Ninth Circuit panel (without citing *Edwards*) subsequently held that a plaintiff had standing, at least for purposes of a motion to dismiss at the outset of the case, to allege Title I and Title II ECPA claims for Wiretap and Stored Communications Act violations, among others, based on the defendants' alleged telephone surveillance, even though the court acknowledged that the plaintiff ultimately might be unable to prove that she in fact had been subject to illegal surveillance, at which point the court, on a more developed record, might conclude that plaintiff lacked standing. See *Jewel v. National Security Agency*, 673 F.3d 902, 908–911 (9th Cir. 2011); see also *Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.*, 742 F.3d 409, 412–14 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding, in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's website published inaccurate information about him, that because the plaintiff had stated a claim for a willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, for which actual harm need not be shown, the plaintiff had established Article III standing, where injury was premised on the alleged violation of plaintiff's statutory rights), vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016); *In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation*, Case No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec 3, 2013) (following *Edwards* in holding that plaintiffs had established Article III injury under the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act by alleging unauthorized access and wrongful disclosure of communications, including disclosure to third parties, in addition to the interception of communications); *Gaos v. Google Inc.*, No. 5:10-CV-4809 EJD, 2012 WL 1094646 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (following *Edwards* in denying defendant's motion with respect to plaintiffs' Stored Communications Act claim).

Courts in the Ninth Circuit had construed *Edwards* and *Jewel* as requiring that even where a plaintiff stated a claim under a federal statute that did not require a showing of damage, plaintiffs had to allege facts

In *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*,<sup>31</sup> the U.S. Supreme Court resolved this circuit split, holding that merely alleging a “statutory violation” is *not* sufficient because “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a

---

to “show that the claimed statutory injury is particularized as to them.” *Mendoza v. Microsoft, Inc.*, No. C14-316-MJP, 2014 WL 4540213 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2014) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under the Video Privacy Protection Act, California Customer Records Act, California Unfair Competition Law and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act where plaintiffs failed to identify an injury that was actual or imminent and particularized and merely offered “broad conclusory statements and formulaic recitations” of the statutes but did not allege facts to support the allegation that Microsoft allegedly retained and disclosed personally identifiable information); *see also Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (following *Edwards* and *Jewel* in finding standing in a case alleging that LinkedIn browsing histories and user identification numbers, sent in connection with third party cookie identification numbers, were transmitted to third parties by LinkedIn, while conceding that “the allegations that third parties can *potentially* associate LinkedIn identification numbers with information obtained from cookies and can de-anonymize a user’s identity and browser history are speculative and relatively weak”; emphasis in original).

The Sixth and Eighth Circuits took a similar approach. *See Beaudry v. TeleCheck Services, Inc.*, 579 F.3d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding “no Article III (or prudential) standing problem arises . . .” where a plaintiff can allege all of the elements of a Fair Credit Reporting Act statutory claim); *Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc.*, 754 F.3d 492, 498-500 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs established Article III standing by alleging facts sufficient to state a claim under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act and therefore did not separately need to show actual damage).

The Fourth and Federal Circuits, however, rejected the proposition that alleging an injury-in-law by merely stating a claim and establishing statutory standing to sue satisfied the separate standing requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. *See David v. Alphin*, 704 F.3d 327, 333, 338-39 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that statutory standing alone is insufficient to confer Article III standing; affirming dismissal of an ERISA claim where the plaintiffs stated a claim but could not establish injury-in-fact); *Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation*, 753 F.3d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a consumer group lacked standing to challenge an administrative ruling, explaining that “‘Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.’ *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (citations omitted). That principle, however, does not simply override the requirement of injury in fact.”).

This Circuit split was resolved by *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).

<sup>31</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).

statutory violation.”<sup>32</sup> Justice Alito, writing for himself and five other justices,<sup>33</sup> reiterated that a plaintiff must show (or at the pleading stage, simply allege<sup>34</sup>) that he or she has suffered “‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”<sup>35</sup>

For an injury to be *particularized*, it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”<sup>36</sup> Justice Alito explained that “[p]articuliarization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is not sufficient. An injury in fact must also be ‘concrete.’”<sup>37</sup>

To be concrete, an injury must be “‘real’ and not ‘abstract.’”<sup>38</sup> It need not be *tangible*, however. “[I]ntangible injuries can . . . be concrete.”<sup>39</sup>

In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, “both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.”<sup>40</sup> With respect to history, “it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or

<sup>32</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).

<sup>33</sup>Justice Thomas concurred in the decision, drawing a distinction between private and public rights. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the plaintiff established standing in this case.

<sup>34</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), quoting *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975).

<sup>35</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), quoting *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Justice Alito explained that while Article III standing is determined by a three part test, *Spokeo* turned largely on the first factor. To establish standing, a plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), citing *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).

<sup>36</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), quoting *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992).

<sup>37</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).

<sup>38</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), citing Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 472 (1971); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 305 (1967).

<sup>39</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).

<sup>40</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).

American courts.”<sup>41</sup> Congress’s “judgment is also instructive and important. . . . Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, *de facto* injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’ ”<sup>42</sup>

While the Court made clear that merely alleging a “statutory violation” is not sufficient, Justice Alito also explained that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”<sup>43</sup> However, “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”<sup>44</sup> For example, “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm . . .” would not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, “the risk of real harm” can satisfy the requirement of concreteness and, in some circumstances, even “the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient . . . .”<sup>46</sup>

In remanding the case for further consideration, Justice Alito reiterated that the plaintiff in that case could not satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Similarly, Justice Alito offered that if the defendant had maintained an incorrect zip code for the plaintiff, “[i]t is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”<sup>47</sup>

*Spokeo* likely will be important in data privacy cases, many of which are premised on little more than an alleged technical statutory violation. *Spokeo* was a compromise 6-2 opinion that likely would have been decided differently had conservative Justice Scalia, who participated in oral argument for

---

<sup>41</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).

<sup>42</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016), quoting *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).

<sup>43</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016), quoting *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992).

<sup>44</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).

<sup>45</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016), citing *Summers v. Earth Island Institute*, 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009).

<sup>46</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).

<sup>47</sup>*Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016).

the case, not passed away before the opinion issued.<sup>48</sup>

The result of *Spokeo* is to hold that merely stating a claim under a federal statute is not sufficient to establish standing, and that mere procedural violations will be insufficient to confer standing.<sup>49</sup> Data privacy cases, of course, have been dismissed for lack of standing on other grounds<sup>50</sup> as well. It

---

<sup>48</sup>See generally *infra* § 27.07 (discussing the opinion and its origins in greater detail in the context of security breach case law).

<sup>49</sup>See, e.g., *Braitberg v. Charter Communications, Inc.*, \_ F.3d \_, 2016 WL 4698283 (8th Cir. 2016) (dismissing for lack of standing, as a case involving a mere procedural violation under *Spokeo*, plaintiff's putative class action suit alleging that his former cable television provider retained his personally identifiable information in violation of the Cable Communications Policy Act because "Braitberg alleges only that Charter violated a duty to destroy personally identifiable information by retaining certain information longer than the company should have kept it. He does not allege that Charter has disclosed the information to a third party, that any outside party has accessed the data, or that Charter has used the information in any way during the disputed period. He identifies no material risk of harm from the retention; a speculative or hypothetical risk is insufficient. Although there is a common law tradition of lawsuits for invasion of privacy, the retention of information lawfully obtained, without further disclosure, traditionally has not provided the basis for a lawsuit in American courts."); *Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc.*, \_ F.3d \_, 2016 WL 3996710 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim under the D.C.'s Use of Consumer Identification Information Act, D.C. Code §§ 47-3151 *et seq.*, which provides that "no person shall, as a condition of accepting a credit card as payment for a sale of goods or services, request or record the address or telephone number of a credit card holder on the credit card transaction form, . . ." for lack of standing, because "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in *Spokeo* . . . closes the door on Hancock and White's claim that the Stores' mere request for a zip code, standing alone, amounted to an Article III injury").

<sup>50</sup>See, e.g., *McCullough v. Smarte Carte, Inc.*, Case No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108, at \*3-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff's putative Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act class action suit for lack of Article III and statutory standing where the plaintiff alleged that Smarte Carte retained her fingerprint biometric information without written consent, where Smarte Carte used a person's fingerprints to allow them to access a rented locker, because "[e]ven without prior written consent to retain, if Smarte Carte did indeed retain the fingerprint data beyond the rental period, the Court finds it difficult to imagine, without more, how this retention could work a concrete harm" and she could not establish that she was "aggrieved by" the alleged violation, to establish statutory standing); *Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.*, Case No. 15-cv-1078-pp, 2016 WL 3390415, at \*4-5 (E.D. Wis. June 17, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff's second amended complaint for lack of Article III standing where the plaintiff alleged injury due to cable provider's retention of names, addresses and social security numbers in alleged violation of the Cable Com-

thus remains to be seen how *Spokes* will affect data privacy law, which is based on many different statutory and common law principles.

*Spokeo*'s impact on putative security breach and TCPA class action suits is addressed in sections 27.07 and 29.16, respectively.

Even where a plaintiff can establish Article III standing, claims based on alleged data privacy violations may not fit well into existing federal statutes and may be dismissed or subject to summary judgment.

A number of data privacy suits have been brought under the Electronic Privacy Communications Act (ECPA).

ECPA authorizes claims under Title I for the intentional *interception* or disclosure of an intercepted communication, whereas claims under Title II may be based on unauthorized intentional *access* to stored communications or the intentional disclosure of those communications.<sup>51</sup>

In behavioral advertising and other alleged data tracking cases, it is important to understand the underlying technology to determine whether a given communication is even covered by ECPA and, if so, permitted or prohibited.

To the extent claims are based on *disclosure* under either Title I or II, as opposed to interception (under Title I) or access (under Title II), civil claims may only be based on the *contents* of a communication. Personal data such as a person's name, email address, home address, phone number or other details that could identify a person, however, are treated as non-content data, not the *contents* of a communication, which is defined under ECPA as "information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication."<sup>52</sup> On this basis alone, most claims premised on disclosure will not be actionable under either Title I or

---

munications Policy Act).

<sup>51</sup>See *infra* §§ 44.06, 44.07.

<sup>52</sup>18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); see also *id.* § 2703(c)(1)(A) ("a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service may disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to any person other than a governmental entity."). "[I]nformation concerning the identity of the author of the communication," which is generally what is at issue in data privacy cases, is not considered "contents." *Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc.*, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1108 (E.D. Mich. 1998). As the legislative history makes clear, ECPA "exclude[s] from the definition of the term 'contents,' the

Title II<sup>53</sup> (subject to narrow exceptions, such as where a URL, which generally is considered non-content data, reveals the

---

identity of the parties or the existence of the communication. It thus distinguishes between the substance, purport or meaning of the communication and the existence of the communication or transactional records about it.” S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), *reprinted in* 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3567; *see also In re Zynga Privacy Litig.*, 750 F.3d 1098, 1105-09 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that URLs, including referer header information, did not constitute the contents of a communication under ECPA; explaining that “Congress intended the word ‘contents’ to mean a person’s intended message to another (i.e., the ‘essential part’ of the communication, the ‘meaning conveyed,’ and the ‘thing one intends to convey.’)” and that “[t]here is no language in ECPA equating ‘contents’ with personally identifiable information.”); *U.S. v. Reed*, 575 F.3d 900, 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that Call Data Content (CDC) is neither the contents of a communication nor a communication under Title I of ECPA; “CDC . . . is data that is incidental to the use of a communication device and contains no ‘content’ or information that the parties intended to communicate. It is data collected by the telephone company about the source, destination, duration, and time of a call.”), *cert. denied*, 559 U.S. 987 (2010); *Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc.*, 253 F.R.D. 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding, in a copyright infringement suit, that YouTube was prevented by the Stored Communications Act from disclosing the content of videos marked by users as private, but ordering “production of specified non-content data about such videos” because “the ECPA does not bar disclosure of non-content data about the private videos (e.g., the number of times each video has been viewed on YouTube.com or made accessible on a third-party website through an ‘embedded’ link to the video).”); *see generally infra* § 50.06[4] (analyzing contents and non-contents under ECPA in greater detail and discussing additional cases).

<sup>53</sup>*See, e.g., In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 935-36 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim because the data allegedly transmitted through cookies about the browsing history of logged-out users was not the contents of a communication); *Svenson v. Google Inc.*, No. 13-cv-04080-BLF, 2015 WL 1503429, at \*7-8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015) (applying *Zynga* in dismissing without leave to amend plaintiff’s SCA claim premised on the alleged disclosure of credit card information (but not numbers), purchase authorization data, addresses, zip codes, names, phone numbers, and email addresses, in connection with the use of Google Wallet); *In re: Carrier IQ, Inc. Consumer Litig.*, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1083-84 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing Wiretap Act claim for alleged interception of user names or passwords by the Carrier IQ Software in a putative consumer class action suit); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim because geolocation data was not the contents of a communication and holding that “personally identifiable information that is automatically generated by the communication but that does not comprise the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication is not covered by the Wiretap Act.”); *see generally infra* § 50.06[4][B].

substance of a communication<sup>54</sup>).

For similar reasons, cases based on non-content data also may fail to state claims under California's constitutional right to privacy or California's Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 631(a).<sup>55</sup>

ECPA, which is comprised of the Wiretap Act (Title I) and the Stored Communications Act (Title II) was never intended to regulate data privacy generally, and certainly not in ways that could never have been conceived of at the time the laws were first enacted. As a statute largely intended to prohibit hacking (in Title II) or eavesdropping or interception (in Title I), ECPA is drawn narrowly in terms of what is covered, what is proscribed and what is permitted with authorization or consent.

Behavioral advertising claims premised on unauthorized *interception*<sup>56</sup> under Title I have failed where there has been

---

<sup>54</sup>See, e.g., *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 135-39 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that a URL potentially could constitute the contents of a communication, depending on the context); *In re Zynga Privacy Litig.*, 750 F.3d 1098, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating in *dicta* that queried URLs could incorporate the content of a communication if they reproduced words from a search engine query, but holding that the referer headers at issue in that case constituted non-content data); *Campbell v. Facebook Inc.*, 315 F.R.D. 250, 265 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that URLs shared on Facebook constituted contents); see generally *infra* § 50.06[4][B].

In one behavioral advertising case, *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*6-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013), the court held that the plaintiff stated a claim where it alleged that non-content data such as a person's UUID, zip code, gender or birthday, was the actual contents of a communication to the plaintiff and not data from a non-content record. *Id.* at \*6-7 (distinguishing *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012)). Merely alleging that non-content data was the substance of a communication, however, does not make it so. See generally *infra* § 50.06[4].

<sup>55</sup>See, e.g., *In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff's CIPA claim where he did not plead facts to show how Facebook used a "machine, instrument or contrivance" to obtain the contents of communications and did not adequately allege that Facebook acquired the contents of a communication); *In re Yahoo Mail Litigation*, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1037-42 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing with leave to amend plaintiff's claim for a violation of California's constitutional right to privacy where plaintiffs alleged that Yahoo's alleged scanning, storage and disclosure of email content violated their right to privacy).

<sup>56</sup>*Intercept* means "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of

consent or no interception<sup>57</sup> (or, at least, no interception by

---

any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). To establish that a defendant “intercepted” an electronic communication, a plaintiff must allege facts that show the electronic communication has been “acquired during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage.” *Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.*, 302 F.3d 868, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2002).

<sup>57</sup>See, e.g., *In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 827 F.3d 262, 274-76 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ Wiretap claim, holding that “Google was either a party to all communications with the plaintiffs’ computers or was permitted to communicate with the plaintiffs’ computers by Viacom, who was itself a party to all such communications.”); *In re Yahoo Mail Litig.*, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1022-31 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding, in a putative Stored Communications Act class action suit, that the plaintiffs consented to email scanning); *Opperman v. Path, Inc.*, No. 3:13-cv-00453-JST, 2014 WL 1973378, at \*29 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (dismissing Wiretap Act claim based on a mobile app’s alleged copying and transmission of electronic address books; “Although Path allegedly transmitted the Class Members’ Contact Address Books from the Class Members’ mobile devices to Path’s servers, Path did not ‘intercept’ a ‘communication’ to do so.”); *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*7–8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (holding, in a behavioral advertising case, that the plaintiff failed to state a Wiretap Act claim in part where (1) he alleged that he provided his personal information directly to Pandora and that Pandora “intercepted” the information from him, rather than alleging that the defendant used a device to intercept a communication from the plaintiff to a third party, and (2) the communication was directed to Pandora, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(3)(A)); *Hernandez v. Path, Inc.*, No. 12-cv-01515-YGR, 2012 WL 5194120, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim on the same grounds as in *Opperman*, cited above); *Marsh v. Zazoom Solutions, LLC*, No. C-11-05226-YGR, 2012 WL 952226, at \* 17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s Wiretap Act claim in a case involving payday loans, where the plaintiff did not allege that any defendant “acquired the information by capturing the transmission of information that was otherwise in the process of being communicated to another party,” or that any defendant used a “device” to intercept the communication); *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712–13 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ Title I claim where the communication either was directed from the user to the defendant (in which case the service was the addressee or intended recipient and therefore could disclose the communication to advertisers as long as it had its own lawful consent) or was sent from the user to an advertiser (in which case the advertiser was the addressee or intended recipient), but in either case was not actionable), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part, on other grounds*, 572 F. App’x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ UCL claim and reversing dismissal of their breach of contract and fraud claims; plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of their ECPA claims); *Crowley v. Cybersource*, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1268-69 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (dismissing an interception claim premised on Amazon.com’s alleged disclosure to co-defendant, Cybersource, where the plaintiff’s email was sent directly to Amazon.com

the defendant).<sup>58</sup> Collecting user data such as a customer's requested URL, the referer URL<sup>59</sup> (the last URL visited before a request was made) and an encrypted advertising network cookie, to provide to a third party to analyze and send targeted advertising similarly has been held to not constitute an interception where the information was collected in the ordinary course of business.<sup>60</sup>

The Stored Communications Act, which is Title II of ECPA, prohibits both unauthorized access (or exceeding authorized access) in section 2701,<sup>61</sup> subject to exceptions for access by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic com-

---

and was not acquired through use of a device).

In *In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit expressly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that "the one-party consent language in the Wiretap Act does not apply . . . because the plaintiffs were minors who were incapable of consenting at all." *Id.* at 275. The court noted that plaintiffs could not find "any authority for the proposition that the Wiretap Act's one-party consent regime depends on the age of the non-consenting party." *Id.* The court also observed that "adopting the plaintiffs' view could mean that the alleged inability of a minor to consent would vitiate another party's consent, which we conclude would be inconsistent with the Wiretap Act's statutory language." *Id.* n.75. It further rejected plaintiffs' argument on policy grounds, "[g]iven the vast potential for unexpected liability whenever a minor happened to browse an Internet site that deployed cookies . . . ." *Id.* at 275.

<sup>58</sup>See, e.g., *Kirch v. Embarq Management Co.*, No. 10-2047-JAR, 2011 WL 3651359, at \*7-9 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2011) (granting summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiff's claim in a putative class action suit where the court found that a third party, rather than the defendant, intercepted the plaintiff's communications), *aff'd*, 702 F.3d 1245, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that section 2520 does not impose civil liability on aiders or abettors), *cert. denied*, 133 S. Ct. 2743 (2013).

<sup>59</sup>*Referer* is the proper terminology, reflecting a spelling error when the term first came into common use, but courts sometimes use the term *referrer* URL or *referrer* header, rather than referer URL or referer header.

<sup>60</sup>See *Kirch v. Embarq Management Co.*, 702 F.3d 1245, 1248-51 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that there was no interception, and hence no violation of ECPA, because the contents of the communications were acquired by Embarq in the ordinary course of its business within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(5)(a)(ii)), *cert. denied*, 133 S. Ct. 2743 (2013). *But see In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig.*, Case No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at \*8-12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (denying Google's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint based on the argument that automatically scanning Gmail messages for keywords for purposes of displaying relevant advertising came within the exception created by section 2510(5)(a)(ii)); see *generally infra* § 44.06[1] (discussing these cases in greater detail).

<sup>61</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(a). Authorization may be given for a limited

munications service<sup>62</sup> and by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user;<sup>63</sup> and knowingly divulging the contents of a communication while in electronic storage in section 2702,<sup>64</sup> subject to exceptions including to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication,<sup>65</sup> where authorized<sup>66</sup> and with lawful consent.<sup>67</sup> Behavioral advertising claims often do not fit well into this framework because they often involve communications that are either not proscribed by the Stored Communications Act or are permitted.

Section 2702 of the Stored Communications Act directs that an entity providing an electronic communication service to the public “shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.”<sup>68</sup> However, a provider of an electronic communication service may divulge the contents of a communication to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication.<sup>69</sup> A provider of an electronic communication service may also access the contents of a communication with the “lawful consent” of an addressee or intended recipient of such communication.<sup>70</sup>

In *In re Facebook Privacy Litigation*,<sup>71</sup> the court dismissed plaintiffs’ Title II claim alleging that by clicking on a banner advertisement, users unknowingly were transmitting infor-

---

purpose. In *Anzaldúa v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Protection Dist.*, 793 F.3d 822, 838 (8th Cir. 2015), for example, the Eighth Circuit stated in *dicta* that where a defendant gave his ex-girlfriend his Gmail user name and password so that she could send his resume to a prospective employer, and only for that purpose, subsequent access to the account would be deemed unauthorized under the SCA.

<sup>62</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(c)(1).

<sup>63</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(c)(2).

<sup>64</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a).

<sup>65</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(1).

<sup>66</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2).

<sup>67</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(3).

<sup>68</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)(1).

<sup>69</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(1).

<sup>70</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(3).

<sup>71</sup>*In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part, on other grounds*, 572 F. App’x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ UCL claim and reversing dismissal of their breach of contract and fraud claims; plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of their ECPA claims).

mation to advertisers, because the communication at issue either was sent to Facebook or to third party advertisers. As explained by the court:

Under either interpretation, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Stored Communications Act. If the communications were sent to Defendant, then Defendant was their “addressee or intended recipient,” and thus was permitted to divulge the communications to advertisers so long as it had its own “lawful consent” to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3). In the alternative, if the communications were sent to advertisers, then the advertisers were their addressees or intended recipients, and Defendant was permitted to divulge the communications to them. *Id.* § 2702(b)(1).<sup>72</sup>

Plaintiffs’ Title I claim against Facebook likewise suffered from a similar defect in that case. The court ruled that a Wiretap Act claim may not be maintained where an allegedly unauthorized interception was either permitted by the statute or not made by the electronic communication service itself.<sup>73</sup>

In *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*,<sup>74</sup> the court similarly dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs’ Stored Communications Act claim under section 2702 based on the allegation that LinkedIn transmitted to third party advertisers and marketers the LinkedIn user ID and the URL of the LinkedIn profile page viewed by a user at the time the user clicked on an advertisement because, even if true, LinkedIn would have been acting as neither an electronic communication service (ECS), such as a provider of email, nor a remote computing service (RCS), which provides computer storage or processing services to the public (analogous to a virtual filing cabinet used by

---

<sup>72</sup>*In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713–14 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (footnote omitted), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part, on other grounds*, 572 F. App’x 494 (9th Cir. 2014).

<sup>73</sup>*See In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712–13 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ Title I claim where the communication either was directed from the user to the defendant (in which case the service was the addressee or intended recipient and therefore could disclose the communication to advertisers as long as it had its own lawful consent) or was sent from the user to an advertiser (in which case the advertiser was the addressee or intended recipient), but in either case was not actionable), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part, on other grounds*, 572 F. App’x 494 (9th Cir. 2014).

<sup>74</sup>*Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

members of the public for offsite storage).<sup>75</sup> In so holding, the court explained that LinkedIn IDs were numbers generated by LinkedIn, not user data sent by users for offsite storage and processing. URL addresses of viewed pages similarly were not sent to LinkedIn by plaintiffs for storage or processing.<sup>76</sup>

Claims under section 2701 of the Stored Communications Act, for unauthorized access (or exceeding authorized access), may fail because they only apply to material in *electronic storage* when accessed from a *facility through which an electronic communication service is provided*, which may not apply to data stored and accessed from mobile devices, tablets or personal computers.

Section 2701 requires a showing that a defendant accessed without authorization “a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided.”<sup>77</sup> “While the computer systems of an email provider, a bulletin board system, or an ISP are uncontroversial examples of facilities that provide electronic communications services to multiple users, . . .”<sup>78</sup> courts have held that an individual’s computer, laptop or mobile device does not meet the statutory definition of a “facility through which an electronic communication service is provided” within the meaning of the Stored Communications Act.<sup>79</sup>

Similarly, claims premised on information stored on user

---

<sup>75</sup>The legal regime governing ECS and RCS providers under ECPA is analyzed extensively in section 50.06[4] (service provider obligations in response to third party subpoenas and government search and seizure orders) and also touched on in sections 44.06 and 44.07 (criminal remedies).

<sup>76</sup>See *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1021-22 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

<sup>77</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(a)(1). “[F]acility’ is a term of art denoting where network service providers store private communications.” *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 147 (3d Cir. 2015).

<sup>78</sup>*In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

<sup>79</sup>See, e.g., *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 146-48 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that a user’s web browser could not constitute a facility); *Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp.*, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1174-75 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (holding that a mobile device is not a facility through which an electronic communications services is provided; explaining that “[t]he fact that the phone not only received but also sent data does not change this result, because nearly all mobile

devices will suffer because the data at issue may not be deemed to be in *electronic storage*. In addition to showing that a defendant intentionally accessed a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided without authorization (or exceeded authorized access), to state a claim under the Stored Communications Act a plaintiff also must show that the defendant, through this unauthorized access, “thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage . . . .”<sup>80</sup> *Electronic storage* is defined as “(a) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (b) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.”<sup>81</sup> Where the information accessed is stored on a user’s device (such as a cookie<sup>82</sup> or universally unique device identifier (UUID)<sup>83</sup> used in connection with

---

phones transmit data to service providers”); *Lazette v. Kulmatycki*, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 755-56 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that a blackberry mobile device was not a “facility” within the meaning of section 2701(a)(1) in a case brought over an employer’s access to a former employee’s personal Gmail account; “the g-mail [sic] server, not the blackberry, was the ‘facility.’”); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1057-58 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (operating system for computer, laptop or mobile device); *Crowley v. CyberSource Corp.*, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270-71 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (a user’s computer); see generally *infra* § 44.07.

<sup>80</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(a).

<sup>81</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17).

<sup>82</sup>See, e.g., *In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’ SCA claim because “Plaintiff’s theory . . . —that Facebook accesses personal information through persistent cookies permanently residing in users’ personal web browsers—cannot be reconciled with the temporary nature of storage contemplated by the statutory definition.”); *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 988 F. Supp. 2d 434, 447 (D. Del. 2013) (explaining, in connection with dismissing plaintiff’s SCA claim, that “[t]here seems to be a consensus that [t]he cookies’ long-term residence on plaintiffs’ hard drives places them outside of § 2510(17)’s definition of ‘electronic storage’ and, hence, [the SCA’s] protection”), *aff’d in relevant part on other grounds*, 806 F.3d 125, 146-48 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ SCA claim because a user’s web browser could not constitute a facility); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1058-59 (N.D. Cal. 2012); *In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); *In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litig.*, No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001).

<sup>83</sup>See *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*8-9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013).

advertising or email stored on a user's own computer<sup>84</sup> or personal email stored on a Blackberry mobile device<sup>85</sup>), the information is not in *electronic storage*<sup>86</sup> as defined in the Act.<sup>87</sup>

As explained by one court, “[t]itle II deals only with facilities operated by electronic communications services such as ‘electronic bulletin boards’ and ‘computer mail facilit[ies],’ and the risk that communications temporarily stored in these facilities could be accessed by hackers.”<sup>88</sup> In other words, email stored on Gmail, Hotmail or Yahoo! servers or private messages stored on Facebook or MySpace servers are different from cookie files or other content stored locally on the hard drive of a user's home or office computer, laptop, tablet or mobile phone.

---

<sup>84</sup>See, e.g., *Hilderman v. Enea TekSci, Inc.*, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1204–05 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

<sup>85</sup>See *Lazette v. Kulmatycki*, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 758 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss but holding that the plaintiff could not prevail to the extent that she sought to recover “based on a claim that Kulmatycki violated the SCA when he accessed e-mails which she had opened but not deleted. Such e-mails were not in ‘backup’ status as § 2510(17)(B) uses that term or ‘electronic storage’ as § 2701(a) uses that term.”).

<sup>86</sup>Under the statute, ‘electronic storage’ means (1) ‘any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof,’ or (2) ‘any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.’” *Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Protection Dist.*, 793 F.3d 822, 839 (8th Cir. 2015), quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17). In *Anzaldua*, the court held that a draft email was not in *electronic storage*; “because the email had not been sent, its storage on the Gmail server was not ‘temporary, intermediate,’ and ‘incidental to the electronic transmission thereof.’” 793 F.3d at 840, quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17). Likewise, the sent version of the same email was not stored for backup purposes; Gmail stores sent messages as a matter of course, not as a duplicate backup. 793 F.3d at 840-42 (noting disagreement among various courts about what constitutes backup). As the Eighth Circuit explained, the SCA “is not a catch-all statute designated to protect the privacy of stored Internet communications; instead, it is narrowly tailored to provide a set of Fourth-Amendment-like protections for computer networks.” *Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Protection Dist.*, 793 F.3d 822, 839 (8th Cir. 2015), quoting Orin S. Kerr, *A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator's Guide to Amending It*, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1214 (2004).

<sup>87</sup>See generally *supra* § 44.07 (analyzing the issue in greater detail).

<sup>88</sup>*In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (cookie files stored on a user's computer).

Even where a *prima facie* claim may be stated, section 2701 creates an express exclusion for conduct authorized “by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user.”<sup>89</sup> ECPA defines a *user* as “any person or entity who (A) uses an electronic communication service; and (B) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use.”<sup>90</sup> Accordingly, courts have held that App providers and websites that accessed personal information from mobile phones or website cookies were *users* within the meaning of ECPA (and any disclosure of personal information therefore was authorized and not actionable).<sup>91</sup> For purposes of ECPA, consumers or other *end users* are not the *users* referenced by the statute.<sup>92</sup> In the nomenclature of the

<sup>89</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(c)(2).

<sup>90</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(13).

<sup>91</sup>*See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 827 F.3d 262, 274-76 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ Wiretap claim, holding that “Google was either a party to all communications with the plaintiffs’ computers or was permitted to communicate with the plaintiffs’ computers by Viacom, who was itself a party to all such communications.”); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that “because the communications [personal information stored on user iPhones, accessed by App providers when users downloaded and installed Apps on their phones] were directed at the App providers, the App providers were authorized to disclose the contents of those communications to the Mobile Industry Defendants.”); *In re Zynga Privacy Litig.*, No. C 10-04680 JWW, 2011 WL 7479170, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ Wiretap and Stored Communications Act claims under Titles I and II of ECPA, with leave to amend, where “the electronic communications in question were sent to Defendant itself, to Facebook, or to advertisers, but both Acts exempt addressees or intended recipients of electronic communications from liability for disclosing those communications.”); *In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 508–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that DoubleClick-affiliated websites are *users* under the statute and therefore authorized to disclose any data sent to them).

<sup>92</sup>*In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the definition of *user* refers to a person or entity). In *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012), the court held that certain mobile advertising providers, but not Apple itself, were authorized recipients of personal information pursuant to section 2701(c). The court explained:

Plaintiffs allege that Apple itself caused a log of geolocation data to be generated and stored, and that Apple designed the iPhone to collect and send this data to Apple’s servers . . . . Apple, however, is neither an electronic communications service provider, nor is it a party to the electronic communication between a user’s iPhone and a cellular tower or WiFi tower. Thus, the Court fails to see how Apple can avail itself of the statutory exception by creating its

statute, end users, or consumers, are referred to as *customer* or *subscribers*.<sup>93</sup>

Pursuant to section 2511(2)(d), a website operator also may be deemed an intended recipient of communications, such as data included in website cookies.<sup>94</sup>

In addition, mistaken disclosures are not actionable under the Stored Communications Act. In *Long v. Insight Communications of Central Ohio, LLC*,<sup>95</sup> the defendant had mistakenly provided the wrong subscriber information in response to a subpoena in a child pornography investigation. The Bureau of Criminal Investigation traced several hundred files containing child pornography to a particular IP address. Investigators requested a grand jury subpoena requiring Time Warner Cable to provide subscriber information linked to the IP address. TWC complied, but mistakenly disclosed subscriber information tied to a different IP address. The person wrongly misidentified and his family sued under the SCA (and for state law claims). In dismissing plaintiffs' putative class action suit, the Sixth Circuit held that the requirements that SCA violations be undertaken *knowingly* and

---

own, secondary communication with the iPhone. With respect to the Mobile Industry Defendants, Plaintiffs allege that when users download and install Apps on their iPhones, the Mobile Industry Defendants' software accesses personal information on those devices and sends that information to Defendants . . . . Thus, the App providers are akin to the web sites deemed to be "users" in *In re DoubleClick*, and the communications at issue were sent to the App providers. See 154 F. Supp. 2d at 508–09. Thus, because the communications were directed at the App providers, the App providers were authorized to disclose the contents of those communications to the Mobile Industry Defendants. The Mobile Industry Defendants' actions therefore fall within the statutory exception of the SCA.

*In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

<sup>93</sup>See *infra* § 50.06[4] (analyzing permitted and prohibited disclosures under ECPA in greater detail).

<sup>94</sup>See, e.g., *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 140-45 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' Wiretap Act claim where plaintiffs alleged that "defendants acquired the plaintiffs' internet history information when, in the course of requesting webpage advertising content at the direction of the visited website, the plaintiffs' browsers sent that information directly to the defendants' servers. Because the defendants were the intended recipients of the transmissions at issue—i.e. GET requests that the plaintiffs' browsers sent directly to the defendants' servers— . . . § 2511(2)(d) means the defendants have done nothing unlawful under the Wiretap Act.").

<sup>95</sup>*Long v. Insight Communications of Central Ohio, LLC*, 804 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2015).

*intentionally* were not met when the defendant did not realize that it was providing the wrong subscriber information in response to the subpoena. The Sixth Circuit held that to impose liability under section 2707(a), there must be “a showing that the provider knew not only that it was divulging information (i.e., that the act of disclosure was not inadvertent), but also what information was being divulged (i.e., the facts that made the disclosure unauthorized).”<sup>96</sup>

Further, even when a Stored Communications Act claim can be stated, at least two circuits have held that a plaintiff may not recover statutory damages under the SCA unless he or she has incurred actual damages.<sup>97</sup>

In addition to user authorization, both Title I and Title II of ECPA create express exceptions where consent has been obtained from customers or subscribers.<sup>98</sup> Customer or subscriber consent may be obtained through assent to the provisions of a Privacy Policy or Terms of Use and thereby provide a defense in litigation. As noted in the House Report,

a subscriber who places a communication on a computer ‘electronic bulletin board,’ with a reasonable basis for knowing that such communications are freely made available to the public, should be considered to have given consent to the disclosure or use of the communication. If conditions governing disclosure or use are spelled out in the rules of an electronic communication service, and those rules are available to users or in contracts for the provision of such services, it would be appropriate to imply consent on the part of a user to disclosures or uses consistent with those rules.<sup>99</sup>

Courts have entered judgment for the defendant or dismissed putative privacy class action suits where consent was inferred from TOU or a Privacy Policy.<sup>100</sup>

In contrast to Title II, Title I addresses communications in

---

<sup>96</sup>*Long v. Insight Communications of Central Ohio, LLC*, 804 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2015). The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s rulings that, on the same facts, the defendant did not commit intentional disclosure of private information under Ohio law, intentional infliction of emotional distress or breach of contract.

<sup>97</sup>*See Van Alstyne v. Electronic Scriptorium, Ltd.*, 560 F.3d 199, 208 (4th Cir. 2009); *Vista Mktg., LLC v. Burkett*, 812 F.3d 954, 965 (11th Cir. 2016).

<sup>98</sup>*See* 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511(2)(d), 2511(3)(b)(ii), 2702(b)(3).

<sup>99</sup>H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1986).

<sup>100</sup>*See, e.g., Cain v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC*, No. 12-CV-15014, 2015 WL 5728834 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2015) (granting summary judgment in favor of Redbox on plaintiffs’ Michigan Video Rental Privacy Act,

breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims in a putative class action suit where the plaintiffs provided written permission to Redbox to allow it to disclose information as set forth in its Privacy Policy); *Garcia v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc.*, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1135-37 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff's California Invasion of Privacy Act claim with leave to amend where the defendant—app provider's Terms of Use and Privacy Policy provided consent for the alleged disclosures); *In re Yahoo Mail Litigation*, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1027-31 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice plaintiffs' Wiretap Act claim based on the allegation that Yahoo scanned and analyzed emails to provide personal product features and targeted advertising, detect spam and abuse, create user profiles, and share information with third parties, and stored email messages for future use based on explicit consent set forth in the Yahoo Global Communications Additional Terms of Service for Yahoo Mail and Yahoo Messenger agreement); *Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing Wiretap Act and SCA claims because plaintiffs consented to LinkedIn's collection of email addresses from users' contact lists through LinkedIn's disclosure statements); *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing, with leave to amend, a trespass and CFAA claim based on the alleged use of browser and flash cookies where, among other things, the potential use of browser and flash cookies was disclosed to users in the defendant's "Conditions of Use and Privacy Notice"); *Kirch v. Embarq Management Co.*, No. 10-2047-JAR, 2011 WL 3651359, at \*7-9 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2011) (holding, in granting summary judgment for the defendant, that the plaintiffs consented to the use by third parties of their de-identified web-browsing behavior when they accessed the Internet under the terms of Embarq's Privacy Policy, which was incorporated by reference into its Activation Agreement, and which provided that de-identified information could be shared with third parties and that the Agreement could be modified; and because the Policy was amended in advance of the NebuAd test to expressly disclose the use and allow users to opt out by clicking on a hypertext link), *aff'd on other grounds*, 702 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2012), *cert. denied*, 133 S. Ct. 2743 (2013); *Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc.*, No. CV-10-63-BLG-RFC, 2011 WL 1842859 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff's ECPA claim based on the terms of defendant's privacy policy and an email sent to subscribers advising them that the Policy had been updated, in a putative class action suit over sharing of cookie and web beacon data); *Mortensen v. Bresnan Communication, LLC*, No. CV 10-13-BLG-RFC, 2010 WL 5140454 (D. Mont. Dec. 13, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff's ECPA claim where the defendant-ISP provided notice to consumers in its Privacy Notice and Subscriber Agreement that their electronic transmissions might be monitored and would in fact be transferred to third parties, and also provided specific notice via a link on its website of its use of the NebuAd Appliance to transfer data to NebuAd and of subscribers' right to opt out of the data transfer (via a link in that notice)), *vacated on other grounds*, 722 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the lower court erred in declining to compel arbitration); *supra* § 26.14[2] (analyzing these cases). *But see In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig.*, Case No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at \*12-15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (denying Google's motion to

transit (or temporary, intermediate storage). In *In re iPhone Application Litigation*,<sup>101</sup> the court held that geolocation data stored for up to a one-year time period did not amount to “temporary, intermediate storage . . . incidental to the electronic transmission . . .” of an electronic communication.<sup>102</sup>

Title I claims also may fail where they are brought over information that is “readily accessible to the general public,”<sup>103</sup> such as material posted on a website<sup>104</sup> or on publicly accessible area of a social network profile page. In some cases, such as those involving social media, the information at issue was intended to be shared or was not otherwise actually private.

By contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that payload data transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks that was inadvertently collected by Google on public roads, incident to capturing photographs for its free Street View service, was not “readily accessible to the public.”<sup>105</sup>

Given the number of parties involved in online and mobile

---

dismiss based on the court’s finding that it did not have express or implied consent within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2)(d) to intercept incoming email to create profiles to send targeted advertising to recipients based on its Terms of Service and Privacy Policy); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1076–77 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss claims in a putative class action suit where the court found some ambiguity in the defendant’s Terms and Conditions).

Consent also may be relevant to the issue of class certification. *See, e.g., Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc.*, No. 13cv0041–GPC–WVG, 2015 WL 5604400 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (denying class certification in a TCPA case based in part on individualized issues of consent); *In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation*, Case No. 13–MD–02430–LHK, 2014 WL 1102660 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (denying class certification because “consent must be litigated on an individual, rather than classwide basis.”).

<sup>101</sup>*In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

<sup>102</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17).

<sup>103</sup>*See* 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (“It shall not be unlawful under . . . chapter 121 of this title for any person—(i) to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public . . .”).

<sup>104</sup>*See, e.g., Snow v. DirectTV, Inc.*, 450 F.3d 1314, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 2006) (dismissing an SCA claim brought by an operator of an online bulletin board based on access to a website that was publicly accessible).

<sup>105</sup>*See Joffe v. Google, Inc.*, 746 F.3d 920, 926–35 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the district court’s ruling that data transmitted over a Wi-Fi

advertising, some suits have sought to hold defendants liable for third party practices. Where direct liability cannot be established under ECPA, however, civil claims may not be maintained based on aider and abettor, conspiracy or secondary liability, at least not under Title I.<sup>106</sup>

To state a civil claim for a CFAA violation, a plaintiff must allege \$5000 in damages,<sup>107</sup> which is a threshold that bars many privacy claims—especially those based on behavioral advertising where there is no economic loss or injury or merely *de minimis* damage. The \$5,000 threshold requirement alone has proven to be an insurmountable bar in many

---

network is not a “radio communication” under the Wiretap Act, and thus could not qualify under the exemption for electronic communications that were “readily accessible to the general public”), *cert. denied*, 134 S. Ct. 2877 (2014); *see generally infra* § 44.06[1] (discussing the case and criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s holding).

<sup>106</sup>*See, e.g., Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc.*, 221 F.3d 158, 168–69 (5th Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001); *Doe v. GTE Corp.*, 347 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[N]othing in the statute condemns assistants, as opposed to those who directly perpetrate the act.”); *Reynolds v. Spears*, 93 F.3d 428, 432–33 (8th Cir. 1996); *Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc.*, 457 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that “a person or entity who aids and abets or who enters into a conspiracy is someone or something that is ‘engaged’ in a violation.”); *Kirch v. Embarq Management Co.*, 702 F.3d 1245, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that section 2520 “does not impose civil liability on aiders or abettors.”), *cert. denied*, 133 S. Ct. 2743 (2013); *In re: Carrier IQ, Inc. Consumer Litig.*, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1089-90 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim where plaintiffs did not allege that the device manufacturers acquired the contents of any of plaintiffs’ communications because “there is simply no secondary liability (such as aiding and abetting) under the ECPA”); *Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc.*, 14 F. Supp. 3d 667, 675 (W. D. Pa. 2014) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim of conspiracy to commit ECPA violations because “secondary liability no longer exists under the current statutory structure of the ECPA.”); *Shefts v. Petrakis*, 954 F. Supp. 2d 769, 774-76 (C.D. Ill. 2013) (granting summary judgment because “Defendant Morgan cannot be held liable under the ECPA under ‘procurement,’ ‘agency,’ ‘conspiracy,’ or any other ‘secondary’ theories of liability . . . .”); *Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz*, 891 F. Supp. 2d 13, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that there is no cause of action under ECPA for secondary liability, aiding and abetting liability or liability for procuring a primary violation (which existed prior to the 1986 amendments to the statute)); *Perkins-Carillo v. Systemax, Inc.*, No. 03-2836, 2006 WL 1553957 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2006); *see generally infra* § 44.06[1].

<sup>107</sup>18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i), 1030(g). A civil CFAA claim where \$5,000 in damages need not be shown may be made on limited grounds generally not applicable to data privacy cases. *See id.*; *infra* § 44.08[1] (analyzing the statutory provisions in greater detail).

data privacy cases.<sup>108</sup> Courts also have been reluctant to

---

<sup>108</sup>See, e.g., *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' CFAA claim for failure to allege the threshold loss of \$5,000 required to state a civil claim under the CFAA, where they could not allege any viable lost marketing opportunity for their data); *Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc.*, 13 Civ. 6592 (NRB), 2016 WL 5080131, at \*8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs' CFAA claim in a suit based on alleged use of tracking cookies); *In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig.*, No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2014 WL 988889, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) (dismissing plaintiff's amended CFAA claim without leave to amend based on plaintiffs' inability to allege \$5,000 in damages based on diminished battery life and data plan use); *In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig.*, No. 11-MD-02264, 2013 WL 1283236, at \*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff's CFAA claim in a suit brought over the alleged sharing of information between the Android Market and advertisers, with leave to amend); *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (dismissing with leave to amend plaintiff's CFAA claim in a behavioral advertising putative class action suit where the plaintiff alleged diminished memory storage but did not allege \$5,000 in damages); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1066-67 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' CFAA claim premised on the cost of memory space on class members' iPhones as a result of storing allegedly unauthorized geolocation data); *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366RSL, 2012 WL 1997697 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 1, 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's CFAA claim for failure to allege \$5,000 in damages); *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910, at \*4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing, with leave to amend, a CFAA claim based on the alleged use of browser and flash cookies for failure to allege \$5,000 in damages or any injury, and questioning in *dicta* whether plaintiffs, in an amended complaint, could allege unauthorized access under the CFAA where the use of browser and flash cookies was disclosed to users in the defendant's "Conditions of Use and Privacy Notice"); *Bose v. Interclick, Inc.*, No. 10 Civ. 9183, 2011 WL 4343517 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011) (dismissing with prejudice a CFAA claim alleging general impairment to the value of plaintiff's computer in a putative behavioral advertising class action suit); *LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc.*, No. SACV 10-1256-GW (JCGx), 2011 WL 1661532 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011); *Czech v. Wall Street on Demand, Inc.*, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (D. Minn. 2009) (dismissing a class action based on allegedly unauthorized text messages sent to plaintiffs' phones where plaintiffs merely alleged in conclusory fashion that the unwanted text messages depleted RAM and ROM, causing phone functions to slow down and lock up, caused phones to shut down, reboot or reformat their memory, interfered with bandwidth and hard drive capacity); *Fink v. Time Warner Cable*, No. 08 Civ. 9628 (LTS) (KNF), 2009 WL 2207920, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (dismissing a CFAA claim because the plaintiff merely alleged damage by "impairing the integrity or availability of data and information," which was "insufficiently factual to frame plausibly the damage element of Plaintiff's CFAA claim"); *In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see generally *supra* § 5.06

treat the disclosure of personal information as having economic value,<sup>109</sup> at least in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

To state a CFAA claim, a plaintiff also must establish that

---

(CFAA case law on database law and screen scraping); *infra* § 44.08 (analyzing the CFAA and case law construing it in greater detail).

In *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015), for example, plaintiffs alleged that their personally identifiable information was both ‘currency’ and a marketable ‘commodity.’ By capturing and making economic use of such information, the plaintiffs alleged, the defendants took the value of this information for themselves, depriving the plaintiffs of their own ability to sell information about their internet use, which caused them harm. *See id.* at 148-49. In rejecting these allegations as insufficient to state a claim under the CFAA, the Third Circuit explained:

The complaint plausibly alleges a market for internet history information such as that compiled by the defendants. Further, the defendants’ alleged practices make sense only if that information, tracked and associated, had value. However, when it comes to showing “loss,” the plaintiffs’ argument lacks traction. They allege no facts suggesting that they ever participated or intended to participate in the market they identify, or that the defendants prevented them from capturing the full value of their internet usage information for themselves. For example, they do not allege that they sought to monetize information about their internet usage, nor that they ever stored their information with a future sale in mind. Moreover, the plaintiffs do not allege that they incurred costs, lost opportunities to sell, or lost the value of their data as a result of their data having been collected by others. To connect their allegations to the statutory “loss” requirement, the plaintiffs’ briefing emphasizes that lost revenue may constitute “loss” as that term is defined in the Act. This is inapposite, however, in that the plaintiffs had no revenue.

*Id.* at 149.

<sup>109</sup>*See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ CFAA claim for failure to allege the threshold loss of \$5,000 required to state a civil claim under the CFAA, where they could not allege any viable lost marketing opportunity for their data); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2012); *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910, at \*3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ CFAA claim, with leave to amend, noting that “[w]hile it may be theoretically possible that Plaintiffs’ information could lose value as a result of its collection and use by Defendant, Plaintiffs do not plead any facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that such devaluation occurred in this case.”); *Bose v. Interclick, Inc.*, No. 10 Civ. 9183, 2011 WL 4343517, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ CFAA claim with prejudice; holding that “[t]he collection of demographic information does not constitute damage to consumers or unjust enrichment to collectors.”); *In re Zynga Privacy Litig.*, No. C 10-04680 JWW, 2011 WL 7479170, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ CFAA claim with prejudice where plaintiffs offered “no legal authority in support of the theory that personally identifiable information constitutes a form of money or property.”).

a defendant accessed a protected computer “without authorization” or “exceeded authorized access.”<sup>110</sup> At least in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, however, CFAA violations premised on use (rather than access) restrictions in a Privacy Policy, Terms of Use or company policy would not be viable.<sup>111</sup>

Authorization similarly may be difficult to show in some data privacy cases where the plaintiff voluntarily downloaded the application that is challenged in the litigation.<sup>112</sup>

In *In re iPhone Application Litigation*,<sup>113</sup> a CFAA claim was dismissed for the further reason that the allegation that Apple had failed to enforce its privacy policy against third party App providers, who made Apps available through Apple’s iStore, was barred because a negligent software design cannot serve as the basis of a CFAA claim.<sup>114</sup>

Numerous putative class action suits have been filed under the Video Privacy Protection Act, which may be brought against a “video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information”

<sup>110</sup>18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4); *see generally infra* § 44.08[1] (analyzing the CFAA in greater detail).

<sup>111</sup>*See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller*, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012), *cert. dismissed*, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013); *U.S. v. Nosal*, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (*en banc*); *infra* § 44.08[1] (analyzing this issue in greater detail).

<sup>112</sup>*See In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ CFAA claim against the “iDevice class” premised on Apple’s alleged practice of using iDevices to retain location history files because, among other things, plaintiffs voluntarily downloaded the software at issue and therefore Apple could not have accessed the devices without authorization); *see id.* at 1068 (dismissing with prejudice claims against the “geolocation class” where “the software or ‘apps’ that allegedly harmed the phone were voluntarily downloaded by the user . . .”). In the *iPhone Application Litigation* case, the court noted in *dicta* that “Apple arguably exceeded its authority when it continued to collect geolocation data from Plaintiffs after Plaintiffs had switched the Location Services setting to ‘off,’ . . .” but dismissed plaintiffs’ claim because they had sued for lack of authorization, not exceeding authorized access. *See id.* at 1066.

<sup>113</sup>*In re iPhone Application Litig.*, Case No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).

<sup>114</sup>*In re iPhone Application Litig.*, Case No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at \*11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011), *citing* 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (“No cause of action may be brought under this subsection for the negligent design or manufacture of computer hardware, computer software, or firmware.”).

about the consumer.<sup>115</sup> However, an online video is not necessarily a *video tape*. The statutory definition of a *video tape service provider* appears to be limited to providers of audio visual and video works in tangible media, not works distributed electronically. The definition generally applies to any person engaged in the business of “rental, sales or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials . . . .”<sup>116</sup> The Senate Report accompanying the bill clarifies that “similar audio visual materials” include such things as “laser discs, open -reel movies, or CDI technology . . . ,”<sup>117</sup> which was a technology for delivering movies on CD-like disks. All of these *materials* involve video stored on tangible media. Nevertheless, this argument about the inapplicability of the VPPA to online video players has not even been addressed.<sup>118</sup>

As analyzed more extensively in section 26.13[10], a VPPA suit will be unsuccessful unless a plaintiff can establish a *knowing* disclosure,<sup>119</sup> because the information disclosed does not qualify as PII under the VPPA’s statutory definition,<sup>120</sup> or because a cause of action under the VPPA may only be

<sup>115</sup>See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(1); see generally *supra* § 26.13[10].

<sup>116</sup>See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(a)(4).

<sup>117</sup>S. Rep. No. 100-599, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 9, 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.A.N. 4342-1, 3435-9 to 3435-10; see generally *supra* § 26.13[10] (expanding on this argument).

<sup>118</sup>See generally *supra* § 26.13[10] (analyzing case law in greater detail).

<sup>119</sup>See *In re: Hulu Privacy Litig.*, 86 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting summary judgment for Hulu because there was no evidence of knowledge); see generally *supra* § 26.13[10] (analyzing the VPPA in greater detail).

<sup>120</sup>See, e.g., *In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that static digital identifiers (a user’s IP address (which permits computer-specific tracking), “browser fingerprint” (a user’s browser and operating system settings), and a computing device’s unique device identifier), which allow for tracking a computer over time, did not constitute PII.); *Robinson v. Disney Online*, 152 F. Supp. 3d 176, 182 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (dismissing plaintiff’s VPPA claim because the encrypted serial number of the plaintiff’s media-streaming device and plaintiff’s video viewing history did not constitute *personally identifiable information*, which is information that “must itself do the identifying that is relevant for purposes of the VPPA . . . ;” it is “not information disclosed by a provider, plus other pieces of information collected elsewhere by non-defendant third parties.”); *Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc.*, C14-463 TSZ, 2015 WL 7252985, at \*5 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s second amended VPPA claim with prejudice because defendant’s alleged

maintained for knowing disclosures, not the failure to delete information within the statutorily prescribed time limit<sup>121</sup> or for the receipt (rather than disclosure) of PII.<sup>122</sup> Several suits also have been dismissed because users of free mobile apps or website video players may not qualify as *consumers* eligible to sue under the statute (although there is a split of authority between the First and Eleventh Circuits on this point).<sup>123</sup>

---

disclosure of plaintiff's Roku device serial number and a record of videos he watched is not PII under the Act; "In light of the VPPA's text and legislative history, 'personally identifiable information' under the VPPA means information that identifies a specific individual and is not merely an anonymous identifier."); *Locklear v. Dow Jones & Co.*, 101 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1316-18 (N.D. Ga. 2015), *abrogated on other grounds by Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc.*, 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015); *Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc.*, No. 1:14-cv-484-TWT, 2014 WL 5023535, at \*3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014) (dismissing plaintiff's Video Privacy Protection Act claim because an Android ID is not "personally identifiable information"), *aff'd on other grounds*, 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015). *But see Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.*, 820 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that a user's GPS coordinates and the Android ID of a user's smart phone plausibly constituted PII under the VPPA); *see generally supra* § 26.13[10] (analyzing these cases).

<sup>121</sup>*See, e.g., Daniel v. Cantrell*, 375 F.3d 377, 384-85 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that "only § 2710(b) can form the basis of liability."); *Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC*, 672 F.3d 535, 538-39 (7th Cir. 2012); *Rodriguez v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, LLC*, 801 F.3d 1045, 1050-53 (9th Cir. 2015); *see generally supra* § 26.13[10] (analyzing these cases).

<sup>122</sup>*See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 827 F.3d 262, 279-81 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that Google could not be held liable under the VPPA for allegedly receiving certain information from cookies placed by Viacom on plaintiff's computers because "only video tape service providers that disclose personally identifiable information can be liable under subsection (c) of the Act . . .").

<sup>123</sup>A *consumer* is "any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider . . ." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(a)(1). Users of free services are not renters or purchasers and frequently may not qualify as *subscribers* if they merely downloaded a free app or visited a website. *See, e.g., Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc.*, 803 F.3d 1251, 1255-58 (11th Cir. 2015); *Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entertainment LLC*, 98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); *see generally supra* § 26.13[10] (analyzing the VPPA in greater detail). *But see Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.*, 820 F.3d 482, 489 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that a plaintiff who downloaded *USA Today's* mobile app to his Android device to watch news and sports video clips, plausibly stated a claim that he was a *subscriber* because in downloading the app he gave Gannett the GPS location of his mobile device, his device identifier and the titles of the videos he viewed in return for access to Gannett's video content).

Because alleged cloud-based, social media and mobile privacy claims often do not fit neatly within the confines of federal anti-hacking statutes or other federal criminal or narrow privacy laws, plaintiffs' lawyers may seek federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).<sup>124</sup> Under CAFA, federal jurisdiction is permissible where more than two-thirds of the members of the putative class are alleged to be citizens of states other than that of the named plaintiff and the amount of damages alleged exceeds \$5 million dollars. Even where plaintiff's counsel alleges the existence of a class of millions of people, the \$5 million bar may be difficult to meet in a case where there has been no economic injury. If the named plaintiffs cannot meet the \$5,000 threshold to state a CFAA claim, for example, a potential class of similarly situated parties who also have not been injured may not meet CAFA's \$5 million threshold.<sup>125</sup>

State law claims may suffer from some of the same defects as federal claims in cases where there is no injury or actual damage or where consent has been obtained or notice provided in Terms of Use or a Privacy Policy. For example, to maintain a state law breach of contract claim, plaintiffs generally must be able to plead and prove actual injury and damage<sup>126</sup> (although in the Ninth Circuit plaintiffs may be able to plead diminishment of the market value of personal

---

<sup>124</sup>28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d).

<sup>125</sup>See Ian C. Ballon & Wendy Mantell, *Suing Over Data Privacy and Behavioral Advertising*, ABA Class Actions, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Summer 2011).

<sup>126</sup>See, e.g., *Svenson v. Google Inc.*, 65 F. Supp. 2d 717, 724–25 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim with leave to amend for failing to sufficiently allege damage where "Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that Defendants' business practice—disclosing users' Contact Information to third-party App vendors—changed her economic position at all."); *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff's breach of privacy policy claim with leave to amend where the plaintiff failed to allege "actual and appreciable damage based on the collection and dissemination of his PII."); *Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc.*, No. 5:12-CV-01399 EJD, 2012 WL 5471149, at \*7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff's suit alleging breach of contract because his first and last name was disclosed in the "from" line of his Yahoo! email account where "an allegation of the disclosure of personal or private information does not constitute actionable damage for a breach of contract claim."); *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028-29 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing plaintiffs' contract claim with prejudice because emotional and physical distress damages are not recoverable for breach of contract under California law and because the unauthorized collection of personal infor-

information<sup>127</sup>).

A claim under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA)<sup>128</sup> likewise may fail where the plaintiff cannot establish that he or she is *aggrieved* by the alleged violation.<sup>129</sup>

---

mation does not create economic loss and plaintiffs did not allege that the collection foreclosed their opportunities to capitalize on the value of their personal information or diminished its value); *In re Zynga Privacy Litig.*, No. C 10-04680 JWW, 2011 WL 7479170, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs' breach of contract claim because California law requires a showing of "appreciable harm and actual damage" to assert such a claim).

<sup>127</sup>See *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 572 F. App'x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (reversing dismissal of plaintiffs' breach of contract claim because alleging that plaintiffs "were harmed both by the dissemination of their personal information and by losing the sales value of that information" was sufficient to state a claim under California law), *rev'g*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 717 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs' contract claim because the unauthorized collection of information by a third party does not amount to an economic loss); *Svenson v. Google Inc.*, Case No. 13-cv-04080-BLF, 2015 WL 1503429, at \*4-5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss breach of contract claim under the benefit of the bargain and diminution of value of personal information theories, where the plaintiff alleged (1) a contract for each Google Wallet transaction whereby she would receive payment processing service that would facilitate her Play Store purchase while keeping her private information confidential in all but specific circumstances under which disclosure was authorized, and (2) the existence of a market for personal information where the value of her information was diminished by Google's alleged use).

Some of the theories alleged by plaintiffs' counsel to survive motions to dismiss would likely be difficult if not impossible to prove at trial or on summary judgment. *Cf. Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2014 WL 988833, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended breach of contract claim, but noting that "Plaintiffs may face an uphill battle proving this claim").

<sup>128</sup>740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/1 to 14/25; *see generally supra* § 26.13[12] (analyzing the statute).

<sup>129</sup>See *McCullough v. Smarte Carte, Inc.*, Case No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108, at \*4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff's putative Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act class action suit for lack of Article III and statutory standing where the plaintiff alleged that Smarte Carte retained her fingerprint biometric information without written consent, where Smarte Carte used a person's fingerprints to allow them to access a rented locker, because, with respect to statutory standing, she could not establish that she was "aggrieved by" the alleged violation, to establish statutory standing).

Some courts, however, have broadly construed the statute in denying motions to dismiss, without addressing statutory or Article III standing. *See In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litig.*, \_ F. Supp. 3d \_\_, 2016 WL 2593853, at \*12-13 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying defendant's mo-

A claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing based on privacy violations may similarly be defective if the claim is merely duplicative of a plaintiff's breach of contract claim or contradicted by the plain terms of the contract.<sup>130</sup>

State computer crime statutes may not provide grounds for relief in a case where there has been no economic harm.<sup>131</sup>

---

tion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims brought over Facebook's "Tag suggestions program" which, using facial recognition technology, allegedly extracted biometric identifiers from user uploaded photographs, even though the statute, on its face, excludes from the definitions of *biometric identifier* and *biometric information* photographs and any information derived from those photographs, based on a broad reading of the statute which narrowly limited the exclusion for photographs to paper prints, not digital images); *Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc.*, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss the claim of a plaintiff, who was not a user of either Shutterfly.com or ThisLife.com and was never presented with a written biometrics policy and did not consent to have his biometric identifiers used by defendants, under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, where defendants allegedly used facial recognition technology to identify and categorize photos based on the people pictured in the photos, including the plaintiff); *see generally supra* § 26.13[12] (analyzing privacy in biometric data).

<sup>130</sup>*See, e.g., Svenson v. Google Inc.*, 65 F. Supp. 2d 717, 725-26 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing plaintiff's breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claim as duplicative of her breach of contract claim); *see also Song Fi Inc. v. Google, Inc.*, 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 885 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting Google's motion to dismiss claims for breach of YouTube's Terms of Service and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising out of plaintiffs' removal of a video where the Terms of Service permitted YouTube to remove the video "and eliminate its view count, likes, and comments"; "if defendants were given the right to do what they did by the express provisions of the contract there can be no breach [of the duty of good faith and fair dealing].").

<sup>131</sup>*See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 827 F.3d 262, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming the district court's dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs' claims under the New Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act (CROA), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:38A-3, an anti-hacking statute, because plaintiffs could not "allege that they had been 'damaged in business or property,' as the plain text of the New Jersey Act requires" and because the appellate panel was not willing to "credit their theory of damage—namely, that the defendants' appropriation of their personal information, without compensation, constituted unjust enrichment . . . [even though] plaintiffs concede that 'unjust enrichment has never been used as a measure of damages' under the New Jersey Act . . ."). The Third Circuit reiterated that merely alleging, as plaintiffs did in this case, that the defendant gained access to information is not sufficient; a plaintiff must present "proof of some activity vis-à-vis the information other than simply gaining access to it." *Id.* at 277, quoting *P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations*

Even specialized statutes intended to make it easy for plaintiffs' counsel to bring consumer class action cases may not be well suited to data privacy suits based on behavioral advertising or other perceived privacy violations where there is no quantifiable harm or only *de minimis* damage. For example, the California Legal Remedies Act (CLRA),<sup>132</sup> which provides a potential remedy to consumers for damages suffered in connection with a consumer transaction, defines a *consumer* as an individual who purchases or leases any goods or services for personal, family or household purposes.<sup>133</sup> A CLRA claim therefore may not be maintained where a plaintiff seeks a remedy from a free Internet site or free app where no purchase has been made,<sup>134</sup> although a Ninth

---

*the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC*, 428 F.3d 504, 509 (3d Cir. 2005). In addition, New Jersey courts, the panel noted, construe the statute as requiring the same type of evidence of damage as that required by the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030. *See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 827 F.3d 262, 278 (3d Cir. 2016).

<sup>132</sup>Cal. Civil Code §§ 1750 *et seq.*; *see generally supra* § 25.04[3] (analyzing the statute).

<sup>133</sup>*Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of California, Inc.*, 125 Cal. App. 4th 949, 960, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233 (4th Dist. 2005).

<sup>134</sup>*See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 152-53 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' CLRA claim and rejecting the argument that Google's alleged access to personal information stored in cookies constituted a forced "sale" of trackable internet history information as a form of payment to Google); *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (rejecting the argument that the plaintiff "purchased" Pandora's services by providing his PII and holding that plaintiff failed to allege he was a "consumer" within the meaning of the CLRA; granting Pandora's motion to dismiss with leave to amend); *In re Zynga Privacy Litig.*, No. C 10-04680 JWW, 2011 WL 7479170, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs' CLRA claim, with leave to amend, because a CLRA claim may only be brought by someone who purchases or leases goods or services but the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's services were offered for free). *But see In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Security Breach Litig.*, 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 992 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that a CLRA claim arising out of a security breach of the PlayStation Network could not be premised on plaintiffs' registration for this free service, but could proceed based on omissions about the security of the service at the time they purchased their PlayStation consoles (a good)); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss where plaintiffs in a data privacy putative class action suit, in their amended complaint, did not merely allege that free apps failed to perform as represented but that the value of their iPhones (a good) would have been materially lower if defendants had disclosed how the free apps in fact al-

Circuit panel, in an unreported decision, allowed a CLRA claim to proceed premised on the lost sales value of personal information.<sup>135</sup> Some courts have also suggested that a CLRA claim may not be made when based on the collection of information by software, as opposed to the sale of goods or services.<sup>136</sup> A CLRA claim also may fail where the plaintiffs cannot allege reliance (for example, when a CLRA claim is premised on the breach of a privacy policy).<sup>137</sup>

Claims under California's Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA)<sup>138</sup>

legedly operated).

<sup>135</sup>See *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 572 F. App'x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (reversing dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs' CLRA claim where plaintiffs alleged injuries from the lost sales value of personal information allegedly disseminated to advertisers).

<sup>136</sup>See, e.g., *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (holding that the Pandora app was not a "good" for purposes of the CLRA); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing an earlier case for the proposition that software is neither a good nor a service under the CLRA); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, Case No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at \*10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (same).

<sup>137</sup>See *In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation*, 58 F. Supp. 3d 968, 982-83 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' CLRA claim, explaining that "[i]f Nisenbaum and the other members of his subclass did not see, read, hear or consider the terms of Google's then-active privacy policy before creating their account, they could not have relied on any representation it contained in making their decisions to purchase Android phones, and without affirmatively alleging reliance on Google's misrepresentations, the CLRA claim cannot survive.").

<sup>138</sup>California's Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), Penal Code § 630, affords a cause of action where a defendant "willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner," intercepted, used, or disclosed the "contents or meaning" of a "communication" that is "in transit." Cal. Penal Code § 631(a); *In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff's CIPA claim where he did not plead facts to show how Facebook used a "machine, instrument or contrivance" to obtain the contents of communications and did not adequately allege that Facebook acquired the contents of a communication).

Section 632 provides an additional potential claim against any "person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication." Courts have rejected claims brought under section 632 for the disclosure of information, however, where a party to the communication does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, including Internet communications. See, e.g., *Campbell v. Facebook, Inc.*, 77 F. Supp. 3d 836, 848-49 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing plaintiff's claim based on al-

or the California Constitution<sup>139</sup> likewise will not be actionable, as under ECPA, if premised on non-content data, as opposed to the contents of communications.<sup>140</sup> A CIPA claim likewise may not be maintained where the defendant itself was a party to the alleged communication.<sup>141</sup> California privacy claims also may not be viable where consent has been obtained<sup>142</sup> or where a privacy violation is not substantial.<sup>143</sup>

Similarly, California's notoriously-broad unfair competition statute requires a showing of actual injury. That statute—California Business and Professions Code section 17200<sup>144</sup>—allows claims to be based on violations of statutes

---

legedly scanned Facebook messages); *In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig.*, Case No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at \*23 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (scanned email); see also *People v. Nakai*, 183 Cal. App. 4th 499, 518, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402 (2010) (holding internet chat to not be confidential).

<sup>139</sup>See *supra* § 26.07[2] (analyzing the contours of California's Constitutional right to privacy, as set forth in Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution).

<sup>140</sup>See *In re Yahoo Mail Litigation*, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1037-42 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing with leave to amend plaintiff's claim for a violation of California's constitutional right to privacy where plaintiffs alleged that Yahoo's alleged scanning, storage and disclosure of email content violated their right to privacy).

<sup>141</sup>See *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 152 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' CIPA claim because Cal. Penal Code § 631(a), like the Wiretap Act, broadly prohibits the interception of wire communications and disclosure of those intercepted communications—*i.e.*, eavesdropping or the secret monitoring by third parties—and could not be applied to Google's alleged use and disclosure of information stored in cookies because Google was itself a party to those electronic communications).

<sup>142</sup>See *Garcia v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc.*, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1135-37 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff's California Invasion of Privacy Act claim with leave to amend where the defendant—app provider's Terms of Use and Privacy Policy provided consent for the alleged disclosures).

<sup>143</sup>See, *e.g.*, *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2014 WL 988833, at \*5-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's claim under the California Constitution based on their inability to allege conduct that was "sufficiently serious in [its] nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right."; citation omitted); see *generally supra* § 26.07[2] (analyzing the California Constitutional right to privacy).

<sup>144</sup>Cal. Bus. & Prof. §§ 17200 *et seq.*

that do not expressly create independent causes of action.<sup>145</sup> Indeed, under section 17200, “[u]nlawful acts are ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law . . . be it civil, criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made,’ where court-made law is, ‘for example a violation of a prior court order.’”<sup>146</sup> A claim under section 17200, however, may not be made absent a showing that a plaintiff “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.”<sup>147</sup> Hence, a plaintiff generally may not maintain suit for privacy violations where the plaintiff obtained access to the defendant’s service free of charge<sup>148</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup>See, e.g., *Kasky v. Nike, Inc.*, 27 Cal. 4th 939, 950, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 304 (2002); *Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.*, 17 Cal. 4th 553, 561–67, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736–40 (1998); see generally *supra* § 25.04[3].

<sup>146</sup>*Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp.*, 517 F.3d 1137, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2008), citing *National Rural Telecommunications Co-op. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1074 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting *Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.*, 93 Cal. App. 4th 700, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 414 (2d Dist. 2001); *Saunders v. Superior Court*, 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 441 (2d Dist. 1994) (internal quotations omitted)).

<sup>147</sup>Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “An injury in fact is ‘[a]n actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest, in contrast to an invasion that is conjectural or hypothetical.’” *Hall v. Time Inc.*, 158 Cal. App. 4th 847, 853, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 466, 470 (4th Dist. 2008). A plaintiff must show loss of money or property to have standing to seek injunctive relief or restitution. *Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court*, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 323–34, 336, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741 (2011); see generally *supra* § 6.12[6] (analyzing section 17200).

<sup>148</sup>See *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 152 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ 17200 claim based on Google’s alleged collection of data stored in Internet cookies); *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 572 F. App’x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs’ UCL claim where plaintiffs could not allege that they “lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.”), *aff’g*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714–15 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ UCL claim where plaintiffs alleged that the defendant unlawfully shared their “personally identifiable information” with third-party advertisers because personal information does not constitute property for purposes of a UCL claim; “Because Plaintiffs allege that they received Defendant’s services for free, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot state a UCL claim.”); *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim with leave to amend where the plaintiff alleged that his PII was diminished in value based on Pandora’s alleged use); *In re Zynga Privacy Litig.*, No. C 10-04680 JWW, 2011 WL 7479170, at \*2 (N.D.

unless the claim may be premised on the value of a product purchased in conjunction with obtaining free services<sup>149</sup> or potentially for breach of a statutory duty to adhere to the terms of a company's privacy policy.<sup>150</sup> Courts have also rejected the argument that plaintiffs have a property interest in their personal information or electronic communications that amounts to lost property under section 17200.<sup>151</sup> Since many Internet sites and services provide free access, this restriction limits potential unfair competition claims against many of the more popular Internet and social media sites.

---

Cal. June 15, 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs' UCL claim, with leave to amend, where plaintiffs did not allege that they lost money as a result of defendants' conduct, but instead merely alleged that defendants shared their personally identifiable information with third party advertisers).

<sup>149</sup>See *Svenson v. Google Inc.*, 65 F. Supp. 2d 717, 730 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing plaintiff's UCL claim with leave to amend for failure to allege economic injury); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1071–74 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss in a data privacy putative class action suit where plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, did not merely allege a UCL violation based on alleged information gathering in connection with free apps, but asserted that they purchased their mobile devices based on the availability of thousands of free apps, but would not have done so if the true value of the devices had been disclosed by revealing that the apps allegedly allowed third parties to collect consumers' information).

<sup>150</sup>See *Svenson v. Google Inc.*, Case No. 13-cv-04080-BLF, 2015 WL 1503429, at \*8-10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's UCL claim, holding that plaintiff stated a claim under both the unlawful and unfairness prongs of the statute by alleging that the defendant failed to adhere to the terms of its own Privacy Policy in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22576, and plaintiff alleged that defendants' payment processing services were not free because they allegedly retained a portion of the \$1.77 app price for each transaction); see generally *supra* § 26.13[6] (analyzing the duty to post a privacy policy imposed on companies that collect personal information from California residents). In *Svenson*, the plaintiff pled around *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 572 F. App'x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs' UCL claim where plaintiffs could not allege that they "lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.") by alleging the existence of a contract and a fee that does not appear to have been plausible in light of the actual written contract entered into by the plaintiff and defendants.

<sup>151</sup>See, e.g., *Campbell v. Facebook, Inc.*, 77 F. Supp. 3d 836, 849 (N.D. Cal. 2014); *Opperman v. Path, Inc.*, Case No. 13-CV-00453-JST, 2014 WL 1973378, at \*23 n.22 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2014); *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 715 (N.D. Cal. 2011); *Claridge v. RockYou, Inc.*, 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

Absent injury, statutory unfair competition claims under the laws of other states similarly may not be viable.<sup>152</sup>

Statutory violations framed as unfair competition claims will suffer a similar fate. For example, claims for alleged statutory privacy violations—such as a failure to provide notice of the right to request information—and unfair competition claims premised on that alleged failure, may be dismissed where no real injury can be pled.<sup>153</sup> False advertis-

<sup>152</sup>See, e.g., *Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc.*, 13 Civ. 6592 (NRB), 2016 WL 5080131, at \*10-13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs' claims under N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 for failure to allege facts showing that they had suffered an injury cognizable under that section, in a putative class action suit based on defendants' alleged use of tracking cookies); *Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc.*, 840 F. Supp. 2d 438, 448–51 (D. Mass. 2012) (dismissing a claim under Massachusetts' unfair trade practices statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2 because receiving unwanted mail and other alleged injuries stemming from the defendant's alleged disclosure of her zip code information was not an injury cognizable under chapter 93A); *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910, at \*5–6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing with leave to amend an unfair competition claim in a putative class action suit over the alleged use of browser and flash cookies because Washington's Consumer Protection Act requires "a specific showing of injury").

<sup>153</sup>See, e.g., *In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Security Breach Litigation*, 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 1009-10 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing plaintiffs' section 1789.84(b) claim for economic damages, but allowing plaintiffs to pursue their injunctive relief claims under section 1798.84(e)); *Murray v. Time Inc.*, No. C 12-00431 JSW, 2012 WL 3634387 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (dismissing, with leave to amend, plaintiff's claims under Cal Civil Code § 1798.83 and Cal. Bus. & Professions Code § 17200 for lack of statutory standing due to lack injury and dismissing plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief for lack of Article III standing; rejecting arguments that plaintiffs had experienced economic or informational injury); *Boorstein v. Men's Journal LLC*, No. CV 12-771 DSF (Ex), 2012 WL 3791701 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's claims under Cal Civil Code § 1798.83 and Cal. Bus. & Professions Code § 17200 for lack of statutory standing due to lack injury; rejecting arguments that plaintiffs had experienced economic or informational injury); *King v. Condé Nast Publications*, No. CV-12-0719-GHK (Ex), 2012 WL 3186578 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2012) (dismissing the same claims on the same grounds, with leave to amend); *Miller v. Hearst Communications, Inc.*, No. CV 12-0733-GHK (PLAx), 2012 WL 3205241 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2012) (dismissing the same claims, on the same grounds, with leave to amend); *Boorstein v. Men's Journal LLC*, No. CV 12-771 DSF (Ex), 2012 WL 2152815 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) (dismissing the same claims on the same grounds, with leave to amend); see generally *supra* § 26.13[6][D] (analyzing section 1798.83).

ing claims under California law<sup>154</sup> likewise will be dismissed where a plaintiff cannot show that it has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property.<sup>155</sup>

Similarly, a claim under California's Computer Crime law (also known as the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act)<sup>156</sup> is only actionable where a plaintiff can show "damage or loss."<sup>157</sup> A CIPA claim also may be unavailable absent circumvention; merely accessing information may not be enough.<sup>158</sup>

---

<sup>154</sup>Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, *et seq.* California's false advertising law reaches advertising that is false as well as advertising that, although true, is either actually misleading or has "a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public." *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2012), *quoting Leoni v. State Bar*, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 626, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1985).

<sup>155</sup>*See Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1026-27 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice Low's false advertising claim because personal information does not constitute money or property and dismissing with prejudice both his claim and that of plaintiff Masand, who paid \$24.99 for a "Job Seeker Platinum" LinkedIn subscription and therefore met the threshold requirement of showing a loss of money or property, where neither could allege reliance on the allegedly false advertisements or misrepresentations).

<sup>156</sup>Cal. Penal Code § 502. A claim under section 502 is similar to a claim under the federal Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030, except that "the California statute does not require *unauthorized* access. It merely requires *knowing* access." *U.S. v. Christensen*, 828 F.3d 763, 789 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). *Access*, according to the Ninth Circuit, "includes logging into a database with a valid password and subsequently taking, copying, or using the information in the database improperly." *Id.*; *see also Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.*, 828 F.3d 1068, 1079 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming liability under section 502 where the defendant continued to access Facebook's servers after having received a cease and desist letter instructing it to stop doing so).

<sup>157</sup>Cal. Penal Code § 502(e); *see also Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 152 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' claim under section 502 where plaintiffs alleged loss of the value of personal data, which the Third Circuit held did not amount to damage or loss); *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 715-16 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs' section 502 claims, some with and some without prejudice), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part, on other grounds*, 572 F. App'x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' UCL claim but reversing dismissal of their breach of contract and fraud claims; plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of their section 502 claim); *see generally infra* § 44.09 (analyzing section 502).

<sup>158</sup>*See, e.g., In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig.*, No. 11-2264, 2013 WL 1283236, at \*11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) ("Courts within this District have interpreted 'without permission' to require that a

Common law privacy claims may be difficult to assert in data privacy cases<sup>159</sup> absent an ability to characterize the alleged intrusion as highly offensive to a reasonable person.<sup>160</sup>

Alleged data privacy violations also may be difficult to as-

---

defendant access a network in a manner that circumvents technical or code based barriers in place to restrict or bar a user's access.”; internal quotation marks omitted).

<sup>159</sup>*See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 827 F.3d 262, 294-95 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' New Jersey intrusion upon seclusion claim against Google for allegedly using tracking cookies to track website activity by children because tracking cookies can serve legitimate commercial purposes and “Google used third-party cookies on Nick.com in the same way that it deploys cookies on myriad others websites. Its decision to do so here does not strike us as sufficiently offensive, standing alone, to survive a motion to dismiss.”); *In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 933 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing intrusion upon seclusion claims in a putative data privacy class action suit because plaintiffs “could not have held a subjective expectation of privacy in their browsing histories that was objectively reasonable”); *In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation*, 58 F. Supp. 3d 968, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' intrusion upon seclusion claim based on plaintiffs' inability to meet the “high bar” to allege the requisite “intrusion [that is] highly offensive to a reasonable person”); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding unauthorized disclosure of mobile device information to not be an egregious breach of social norms); *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding disclosure of LinkedIn data insufficiently offensive); *see generally supra* §§ 12.02[3][B], 26.08 (analyzing tort of unreasonable intrusion on seclusion, at greater length).

<sup>160</sup>*See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 827 F.3d 262, 295 (3d Cir. 2016) (vacating an order dismissing plaintiffs' intrusion upon seclusion claim against Viacom based on the collection of information using allegedly duplicitous tactics, where the Nickelodeon website allegedly included the false message: “HEY GROWN-UPS: We don't collect ANY personal information about your kids. Which means we couldn't share it even if we wanted to!”; “Viacom's message to parents about not collecting children's personal information may have created an expectation of privacy on Viacom's websites, it also may have encouraged parents to permit their children to browse those websites under false pretenses.”); *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125, 149-52 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that plaintiffs stated claims under the California Constitution and California tort law where plaintiffs alleged practices that allegedly went beyond disclosed tracking to allegedly include overriding cookie blocking software to access information and involved alleged misstatements about its practices); *Opperman v. Path, Inc.*, 84 F. Supp. 3d 962, 991-93 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying defendants' motions to dismiss intrusion on seclusion claims arising from the transfer of contact information from users' mobile address books when users selected the “Find Friends” feature to connect with friends on social networks).

sert as common law privacy claims where information may have been exposed but it is not clear that it in fact was accessed. At least at common law, “[f]or a person’s privacy to be invaded, their personal information must, at a minimum, be disclosed to a third party.”<sup>161</sup>

Some claims also suffer because of efforts to shoehorn novel privacy theories into existing unfair competition, statutory or common law remedies. For example, in *Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corp.*,<sup>162</sup> the court dismissed claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and for unjust enrichment and invasion of privacy, in a putative class action brought by a union and its members, alleging that the defendant sold de-identified information obtained in connection with filling plaintiffs’ prescriptions to third parties who plaintiffs alleged potentially could de-anonymize it. Plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants made material misrepresentations in their privacy statements, but the court found this practice to be

---

<sup>161</sup>*In re SAIC Corp.*, 45 F. Supp. 2d 14, 28 (D.D.C. 2014); *see also Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claims under the California Constitution and common law where plaintiffs alleged that the defendant disclosed to third parties their LinkedIn IDs and the URLs of the LinkedIn profile pages that the users viewed because “[a]lthough Plaintiffs postulate that these third parties could, through inferences, de-anonymize this data, it is not clear that anyone has actually done so.”). In *SAIC*, Judge James E. Boasbert, Jr. explained that “[i]f no one has viewed your private information (or is about to view it imminently), then your privacy has not been violated.” *Id.* at 28-29, *citing* 5 C.F.R. § 297.102 (Under Privacy Act, “[d]isclosure means providing *personal review* of a record, or a copy thereof, to someone other than the data subject or the data subject’s authorized representative, parent, or legal guardian.”) (emphasis added); *Walia v. Chertoff*, No. 06—6587, 2008 WL 5246014, at \*11 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2008) (“accessibility” is not the same as “active disclosure”); *Schmidt v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs*, 218 F.R.D. 619, 630 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (Disclosure is “the placing into the view of another information which was previously unknown,” requiring that information be “actually viewed.”); *Harper v. United States*, 423 F. Supp. 192, 197 (D.S.C. 1976) (Disclose means “the imparting of information which in itself has meaning and which was previously unknown to the person to whom it was imparted.”); *Fairfax Hospital v. Curtis*, 492 S.E.2d 642, 644 (Va. 1997) (violation where third party “possess[ed]” and “reviewed” records); *see also Storm v. Paytime, Inc.*, 90 F. Supp. 3d. 359, 368 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (dismissing Pennsylvania privacy claims of employees for lack of standing where no information had been disclosed to a third party after a cyber-attack on the defendant’s payroll provider).

<sup>162</sup>*Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corp.*, Civil Action No. 11-2428, 2012 WL 507807 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2012).

consistent with CVS's privacy policy statement that defendants safeguarded information that "may identify" consumers, noting that the FTC's Privacy Rule promulgated under HIPAA<sup>163</sup> places no restrictions on the use of information once de-identified.<sup>164</sup> Plaintiffs' unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims were dismissed based on the lack of any value to the information, among other grounds.<sup>165</sup>

A claim for common law trespass generally requires a showing of substantial impairment, not merely unauthorized access.<sup>166</sup> For this reason, plaintiffs in putative behavioral advertising privacy class action suits may have difficulty stating a claim even where unauthorized access is alleged.<sup>167</sup>

---

<sup>163</sup>45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.502(d)(1) to 164.502(d)(2); *supra* § 26.11.

<sup>164</sup>*See Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corp.*, Civil Action No. 11-2428, 2012 WL 507807, at \*6-7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2012).

<sup>165</sup>*See Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corp.*, Civil Action No. 11-2428, 2012 WL 507807, at \*8-9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2012).

<sup>166</sup>*See, e.g., Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc.*, 13 Civ. 6592 (NRB), 2016 WL 5080131, at \*9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs' trespass claim in a putative class action suit based on alleged use of tracking cookies); *Intel Corp. v. Hamidi*, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1347, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32 (2003); *see generally supra* § 5.05[1] (analyzing computer trespass cases).

<sup>167</sup>*See, e.g., In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig.*, No. 11-MD-02264, 2013 WL 1283236, at \*13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs' trespass to chattels claim because CPU processing, battery capacity, and Internet connectivity do not constitute a harm sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass); *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*15-16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs' trespass claim with leave to amend where the plaintiff alleged that Pandora installed unwanted code that consumed portions of the memory on his mobile device); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing plaintiffs' trespass claims with prejudice where plaintiffs alleged that (1) the creation of location history files and app software components "consumed portions of the cache and/or gigabytes of memory on their devices" and (2) apps had taken up valuable bandwidth and storage space on mobile devices and the defendants' conduct subsequently shortened the battery life of the device; "While these allegations conceivably constitute a harm, they do not plausibly establish a significant reduction in service constituting an interference with the intended functioning of the system, which is necessary to establish a cause of action for trespass."); *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910, at \*6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing with leave to amend a putative class action claim for trespass under Washington law based on the alleged use of browser and flash cookies where plaintiffs "failed to plead any facts that would permit the Court to infer that they sustained any plausible harm to a materially valuable interest in the condition, quality, or value of their computers.").

Where a plaintiff cannot state a claim under ECPA because access was found to be authorized by a Privacy Policy, TOU or otherwise, the plaintiff also may have difficulty establishing a claim for common law invasion of privacy premised on the same unauthorized access.<sup>168</sup> Privacy claims arising at common law or created by the California Constitution likewise may not be viable in a data privacy or behavioral advertising case where the information allegedly disclosed is anonymized data such as social network profile IDs or the URLs viewed by users<sup>169</sup> or unique mobile device

---

<sup>168</sup>See, e.g., *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff's California common law privacy claim based on public disclosure of private facts and intrusion with leave to amend where the plaintiff alleged merely that he provided Pandora with PII, which it then disclosed to third parties; "Yunker does not allege that Pandora tracked his movements or obtained and then either disclosed or left unencrypted any type of sensitive financial information, medical information, or passwords."); *Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc.*, No. CV-10-63-BLG-RFC, 2011 WL 1842859 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011) (dismissing a putative class action alleging an ECPA violation and intrusion upon seclusion under Montana law where defendant's privacy policy and an email sent to subscribers advising them that the Policy had been updated, notified subscribers that CenturyTel, an ISP, used cookies and web beacons to gather information on its subscribers' browsing history, which it shared with NebuAd, a provider of tailored advertising services); *Mortensen v. Bresnan Communication, LLC*, No. CV 10-13-BLG-RFC, 2010 WL 5140454 (D. Mont. Dec. 13, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim where the complaint sufficiently alleged plaintiff's subjective expectation of seclusion or solitude but this subjective expectation was not objectively reasonable in light of the disclosures in defendant's Subscriber Agreement and Privacy Notice and notice that use of the defendant's service constituted acceptance of the terms of the Subscriber Agreement and Privacy Notice; also dismissing plaintiff's ECPA claim, but denying defendant's motion with respect to trespass and CFAA claims), *vacated on other grounds*, 722 F.3d 1151, 1157-61 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the lower court erred in declining to compel arbitration). In the words of the *Deering* court, "there is no [objectively] reasonable expectation of privacy when a plaintiff has been notified that his Internet activity may be forwarded to a third party to target him with advertisements." *Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc.*, No. CV-10-63-BLG-RFC, 2011 WL 1842859, at \*2 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011).

<sup>169</sup>See, e.g., *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' invasion of privacy claims under the California Constitution and common law where plaintiffs alleged that the defendant disclosed to third parties their LinkedIn IDs and the URLs of the LinkedIn profile pages that the users viewed because "[a]lthough Plaintiffs postulate that these third parties could, through inferences, de-anonymize this data, it is not clear that anyone has actually done so.").

identifier numbers, personal data and geolocation information<sup>170</sup> (except in limited circumstances<sup>171</sup>).

---

<sup>170</sup>See *In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 827 F.3d 262, 294-95 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' New Jersey intrusion upon seclusion claim against Google for allegedly using tracking cookies to track website activity by children because tracking cookies can serve legitimate commercial purposes and "Google used third-party cookies on Nick.com in the same way that it deploys cookies on myriad others websites. Its decision to do so here does not strike us as sufficiently offensive, standing alone, to survive a motion to dismiss."); *In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 933 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing intrusion upon seclusion claims in a putative data privacy class action suit because plaintiffs "could not have held a subjective expectation of privacy in their browsing histories that was objectively reasonable" because "Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the . . . IP addresses of the websites they visit . . . [and] should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information."); citing *United States v. Forrester*, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007)); *In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation*, 58 F. Supp. 3d 968, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' intrusion upon seclusion claim based on plaintiffs' inability to meet the "high bar" to allege the requisite "intrusion [that is] highly offensive to a reasonable person"); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that the alleged disclosure to third parties of the unique device identifier numbers of Apple mobile devices, personal data stored by users on those devices and geolocation information did not involve an egregious breach of social norms and therefore was not actionable under California's constitutional right to privacy); see also *In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig.*, No. 11-MD-02264, 2013 WL 1283236, at \*10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (following *iPhone Application Litigation* in dismissing plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy claim where plaintiffs alleged that Google allowed third party affiliates such as AdMob and AdWhirl to obtain unencrypted user data); *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*14-15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (following *iPhone Application Litigation* in dismissing plaintiff's claim with leave to amend where the plaintiff merely alleged that Pandora obtained his PII and provided it to advertising libraries for marketing purposes, allegedly in violation of Pandora's privacy policy).

<sup>171</sup>See, e.g., *In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, 827 F.3d 262, 295 (3d Cir. 2016) (vacating an order dismissing plaintiffs' intrusion upon seclusion claim against Viacom based on the collection of information using allegedly duplicitous tactics, where the Nickelodeon website allegedly included the false message: "HEY GROWN-UPS: We don't collect ANY personal information about your kids. Which means we couldn't share it even if we wanted to!"; "Viacom's message to parents about not collecting children's personal information may have created an expectation of privacy on Viacom's websites, it also may have encouraged parents to permit their children to browse those websites under false pretenses."); *In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 806 F.3d 125,

A plaintiff may be unable to state a claim for unjust enrichment, which is a quasi-contract claim, where he or she entered into an express agreement, such as Terms of Use or a Privacy Policy, explicitly permits the collection, use or dissemination of personal information.<sup>172</sup> A state law conversion claim may suffer the same defect.<sup>173</sup> Conversion claims similarly may fail if user contact information is not viewed as property under applicable state law or if the data at issue

---

149-52 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that plaintiffs stated claims under the California Constitution and California tort law where plaintiffs alleged practices that allegedly went beyond disclosed tracking to allegedly include overriding cookie blocking software to access information and involved alleged misstatements about its practices); *Opperman v. Path, Inc.*, 84 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing conversion and injunctive relief claims but denying defendants' motions to dismiss intrusion on seclusion claims arising from the transfer of contact information from users' mobile address books when users selected the "Find Friends" feature to connect with friends on social networks).

<sup>172</sup>See, e.g., *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910, at \*6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing with leave to amend a putative class action suit over the alleged use of browser and flash cookies where the defendant's potential use of browser and flash cookies was disclosed to users in the defendant's "Conditions of Use and Privacy Notice" so therefore any use was not inequitable and because "Plaintiffs have not plead any facts from which the Court might infer that Defendant's decision to record, collect, and use its account of Plaintiffs' interactions with Defendant came at Plaintiffs' expense."); *In re Facebook Privacy Litig.*, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 718 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim with prejudice where plaintiffs assented to Facebook's "Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy"), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part, on other grounds*, 572 F. App'x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' UCL claim but reversing dismissal of their breach of contract and fraud claims; plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of their unjust enrichment claim).

<sup>173</sup>See, e.g., *In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Security Breach Litigation*, 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claims for conversion because personal information could not be construed as property that was somehow "delivered" to Sony and expected to be returned, and because the information was stolen as a result of a criminal intrusion of Sony's Network); *AD Rendon Communications, Inc. v. Lumina Americas, Inc.*, No. 04-CV-8832 (KMK), 2007 WL 2962591 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2007) ("[E]ven if a plaintiff meets all of the elements of a conversion claim, the claim will still be dismissed if it is duplicative of a breach of contract claim."), *citing Wechsler v. Hunt Health Systems, Ltd.*, 330 F. Supp. 2d 383, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) and *Richbell Information Services, Inc. v. Jupiter Partners, L.P.*, 309 A.D.2d 288, 765 N.Y.S.2d 575, 590 (1st Dep't 2003); *see generally supra* § 5.05[2] (analyzing conversion claims in connection with database protection and screen scraping).

is generated by the Internet site or service, rather than the consumer.<sup>174</sup>

Although not analyzed to date in a data privacy case, conversion claims also may not be viable under some state's laws because data privacy cases usually involve sharing personal information, not dispossession, but most states require a showing of dispossession (or at least substantial interference).<sup>175</sup>

Courts also have been skeptical that a legally cognizable benefit has been conferred when an unjust enrichment claim is premised on the alleged use of a user's browsing information<sup>176</sup> or zip code data<sup>177</sup> or the sale of de-identified personal

---

<sup>174</sup>See, e.g., *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1030-31 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claim for conversion because personal information does not constitute property under California law, plaintiffs could not establish damages and some of the information allegedly "converted," such as a LinkedIn user ID number, was generated by LinkedIn, and therefore not property over which a plaintiff could claim exclusivity); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1074-75 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' conversion claim because personal information does not constitute property under California law, plaintiffs failed to establish that "the broad category of information referred to as 'personal information' is an interest capable of precise definition" and the court could not conceive how "the broad category of information referred to as 'personal information' . . . is capable of exclusive possession or control."); see also *Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.*, No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at \*16-17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (following *iPhone Application Litigation* in dismissing plaintiff's conversion claim based on Pandora's alleged use of his PII with leave to amend); see generally *supra* §§ 5.05[2] (analyzing the law of conversion), 7.21 (intangible property and the law of conversion, addressed in the context of domain name registrations).

<sup>175</sup>See, e.g., *Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.*, 356 F.3d 393, 437-38 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Traditionally, courts have drawn a distinction between interference by dispossession, . . . which does not require a showing of actual damages, . . . and interference by unauthorized use or intermeddling, . . . which requires a showing of actual damages . . . ."; citations omitted) (New York law); *eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.*, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (distinguishing trespass from conversion); see generally *supra* § 5.05[2] (analyzing the law of conversion); see generally *supra* § 5.05[2].

<sup>176</sup>See, e.g., *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910, at \*6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing with leave to amend a putative class action suit over the alleged use of browser and flash cookies where the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to allege any legally cognizable benefit). Under Washington law, to establish unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) one party conferred a benefit

information.<sup>178</sup>

Under California law, it is no longer clear that a separate claim may even be asserted for unjust enrichment, which since 2011 courts have characterized as a request for restitution, not a separate cause of action under California law.<sup>179</sup> Other states, such as New Jersey, similarly do not recognize

---

on the other; (2) the party receiving the benefit had knowledge of that benefit; and (3) the party receiving the benefit accepted or retained the benefit under circumstances that would make it inequitable for the receiving party to retain it without paying for its value. *See id.*, quoting *Cox v. O'Brien*, 150 Wash. App. 24, 37, 206 P.3d 682 (2009). “The crux of an unjust enrichment claim is ‘that a person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is liable in restitution to the other.’” *Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. C11-366-RSL, 2011 WL 6325910, at \*6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011), quoting *Dragt v. Dragt/DeTray, LLC*, 139 Wash. App. 560, 576, 161 P.3d 473 (2007).

<sup>177</sup>*See Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc.*, 840 F. Supp. 2d 438, 451–52 (D. Mass. 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim under Massachusetts law where the plaintiff had not alleged that Michaels ever paid for zip codes or that reasonable people would expect payment for revealing a zip code in connection with a routine retail transaction); *see also Karp v. Gap, Inc.*, No. 13–11600–GAO, 2014 WL 4924229, at \*2 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2014) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim arising out of the merchant’s collection of zip codes); *Lewis v. Collective Brands, Inc.*, No. 13–12702–GAO, 2014 WL 4924413, at \*1–2 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2014) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim arising out of a merchant’s collection of zip codes).

<sup>178</sup>*See Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corp.*, Civil Action No. 11-2428, 2012 WL 507807, at \*9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2012) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment under Pennsylvania law, in a putative class action suit, where plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation that they would be compensated for disclosing information for the purpose of having their prescriptions filled).

<sup>179</sup>*See Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp.*, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1295, 1307, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109 (2011) (holding that “[u]njust enrichment is not a cause of action, just a restitution claim.”); *see also, e.g., Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment because such a claim is not viable under California law); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1075–76 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment based on *Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp.*); *Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.*, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 814–15 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing a claim for unjust enrichment in light of *Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp.*, “[n]otwithstanding earlier cases suggesting the existence of a separate, stand-alone cause of action for unjust enrichment . . . .”); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, Case No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at \*15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (dismissing a claim for unjust enrichment, finding there is no longer any such cognizable claim under California law).

unjust enrichment as a separate cause of action.<sup>180</sup> Even where recognized, a claim for unjust enrichment may not be viable if the data does not have a value or enrich the defendant.<sup>181</sup>

California likewise does not recognize a separate cause of action for restitution, which is a remedy that a plaintiff may elect, not a claim.<sup>182</sup>

Even negligence claims may be difficult to sustain in the absence of economic injury.<sup>183</sup> Negligence generally requires a showing of (1) a legal duty to use due care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) injury and (4) proximate causation (that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of injury).<sup>184</sup> To state a claim, a plaintiff in a data privacy case generally must show an “appreciable, nonspeculative, present injury.”<sup>185</sup> Further, in most states, purely economic losses generally are not

<sup>180</sup>See *In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation*, Case Nos. Civ. A. 12-07829, Civ. A. 13-03729, Civ. A. 13-03731, Civ. A. 13-03755, Civ. A. 13-03756, Civ. A. 13-03757, 2014 WL 3012873, at \*19 (D.N.J. July 2, 2014) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ common law unjust enrichment claim in a data privacy case), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part, on other grounds*, 827 F.3d 262, 271 n.36 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting, in connection with affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ New Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act claim, that the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ common law unjust enrichment “claim with prejudice. . . . The plaintiffs eventually explained [on appeal] that they sought to use unjust enrichment ‘not as an independent action in tort, but as a measure of damages under the [New Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act] in a quasi-contractual sense.’”).

<sup>181</sup>See *e Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc.*, 13 Civ. 6592 (NRB), 2016 WL 5080131, at \*13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim where they failed to plead injury based on misappropriation of the value of their browsing information).

<sup>182</sup>*In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment, assumpsit and restitution).

<sup>183</sup>See *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1031-32 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ claim); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, Case No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim with leave to amend); see also *infra* § 27.07 (analyzing the extensive body of negligence case law in data security breach putative class action suits).

<sup>184</sup>*E.g.*, *Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1031-32 (N.D. Cal. 2012); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, Case No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).

<sup>185</sup>*Low v. LinkedIn Corp.*, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2012); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see also *Ruiz v. Gap, Inc.*, 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913-14 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiffs’

recoverable as tort damages.<sup>186</sup> A negligence claim also may be difficult to sustain where a privacy policy discloses that information will be shared, undermining any argument that there was a duty to keep it confidential.

In some cases involving the use of mobile devices, plaintiffs have alleged breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, which may fail because any alleged privacy violation does not necessarily mean that the device is not “fit for the ordinary purposes” for which the goods were intended.<sup>187</sup>

---

negligence claim in a security breach case brought by a job applicant whose personal information had been stored on a laptop of the defendant’s that had been stolen, because the risk of future identity theft did not rise to the level of harm necessary to support plaintiff’s negligence claim, which under California law must be appreciable, non-speculative, and present), *aff’d mem.*, 380 F. App’x 689 (9th Cir. 2010); *Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Inc.*, 594 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. La. 2009) (holding that the mere possibility that personal information was at increased risk did not constitute an actual injury sufficient to state claims for fraud, breach of contract (based on emotional harm), negligence, among other claims, but holding that the plaintiff had stated a claim for invasion of privacy).

<sup>186</sup>*See, e.g., In re TJX Cos. Retail Security Breach Litig.*, 564 F.3d 489, 499–500 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming, in a security breach case arising out of a hacker attack, dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claim based on the economic loss doctrine (which holds that purely economic losses are unrecoverable in tort and strict liability actions in the absence of personal injury or property damage)); *Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.*, 533 F.3d 162, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2008) (dismissing issuer bank’s negligence claim against a merchant bank for loss resulting from a security breach based on the economic loss doctrine, which provides that no cause of action exists for negligence that results solely in economic damages unaccompanied by physical or property damage); *In re Target Corp. Data Security Breach Litigation*, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1171–76 (D. Minn. 2014) (dismissing plaintiffs’ California, Illinois and Massachusetts negligence claims under the economic loss rule in data security breach putative class action suit); *In re iPhone Application Litig.*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ negligence claim in a data privacy putative class action suit, holding that under California law injuries from disappointed expectations from a commercial transaction must be addressed through contract, not tort law); *In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig.*, 830 F. Supp. 2d 518, 528–31 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ negligence and negligence *per se* claims under the economic loss rule in a security breach putative class action suit).

<sup>187</sup>*See, e.g., In re iPhone 4S Consumer Litig.*, No. C 12-1127 CW, 2013 WL 3829653, at \*15-16 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2013) (holding that the implied warranty of merchantability is limited to “functions like making and receiving calls, sending and receiving text messages, or allowing for the use of mobile applications.”; citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1(a); Cal. Com. Code § 2134(2)(c)); *see also Birdsong v. Apple, Inc.*, 590 F.3d 955, 958 (9th

Even if some Internet privacy claims can survive motions to dismiss or summary judgment, they are often ill-suited for class certification because the proposed classes are defined in terms of conduct for which no records exist, and are therefore unascertainable,<sup>188</sup> or involve numerous individualized inquiries into issues of consent, causation, reliance, and injury that may be specific to individual claimants and therefore potentially ill suited for class adjudication. For example, in *Murray v. Financial Visions, Inc.*,<sup>189</sup> the court denied class certification in a case alleging that the defendants, including a web hosting and email services company, violated plaintiffs' privacy by intercepting and forwarding emails to comply with broker-dealer regulations, because demonstrating liability would have required numerous individualized inquiries, including whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in each email, whether the email contained private information, and whether defendant's conduct caused any harm. Class certification also may be inappropriate where plaintiffs seek certification of a nationwide class based on state consumer protection laws.<sup>190</sup>

---

Cir. 2009) (dismissing California implied warranty claim because the allegation that iPods were capable of operating at volumes that could damage users' hearing did not constitute an allegation that the product lacked "even the most basic degree of fitness" for the ordinary purpose of listening to music); *Williamson v. Apple, Inc.*, No. 5:11-cv-00377 EJD, 2012 WL 3835104, at \*8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012) (dismissing implied warranty claim based on plaintiff's allegation that his iPhone 4's glass housing was defective because plaintiff did not allege his phone was deficient in making and receiving calls, sending and receiving text messages or allowing for the use of mobile applications). *But see In re: Carrier IQ, Inc. Consumer Litig.*, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1108-11 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (allowing breach of implied warranty claims to proceed under the laws of several states where plaintiffs alleged that software was included on mobile devices that collected and transmitted personal information provided adequate grounds under the laws of some states to allege that the devices were unmerchantable).

<sup>188</sup>See, e.g., *Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem*, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a class whose membership is defined by liability is improper).

<sup>189</sup>*Murray v. Financial Visions, Inc.*, No. CV-07-2578-PHX-FJM, 2008 WL 4850328 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2008).

<sup>190</sup>See, e.g., *Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co.*, 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that common questions did not predominate for purposes of class certification where a nationwide state law consumer class was sought given material differences between California and other

Similarly, in *In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation*,<sup>191</sup> the court declined to certify a class action suit where common questions did not predominate because of the variety of different privacy policies and disclosures made to class members and the need for individualized proof of whether class members provided consent.

On the other hand, in *Harris v. comScore*,<sup>192</sup> a court certified a class in a suit alleging Stored Communications Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act violations arising out of comScore's alleged practice of tracking the browsing activities of users who downloaded its tracking software.

Courts also may certify equitable classes pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) even where a common question class action would be inappropriate.<sup>193</sup>

While suits seeking to frame uses of new technologies as computer crime violations on the whole have not been very successful on the merits, potential claims may be easier to plead where a defendant can show a real injury and a clear lack of consent or authorization. For example, a court may allow a claim to proceed where a defendant is alleged to have engaged in conduct materially different from what was represented.<sup>194</sup> A violation of a privacy policy, for instance, is potentially actionable, but only if material and typically only if a plaintiff can show actual injury or damage, as well as standing to sue for a privacy policy violation.<sup>195</sup>

Likewise, where there is a security breach and resulting

---

state consumer protection laws).

<sup>191</sup>*In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation*, Case No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2014 WL 1102660 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (denying plaintiff's motion for class certification in consolidated privacy cases alleging violations of state and federal antiwiretapping laws in connection with the operation of Gmail).

<sup>192</sup>*Harris v. comScore*, 292 F.R.D. 579 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

<sup>193</sup>*See, e.g., Campbell v. Facebook Inc.*, 315 F.R.D. 250 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying plaintiffs' motion to certify a common question Rule 23(b)(3) class but certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) equitable class involving the alleged scanning of Facebook messages).

<sup>194</sup>*See, e.g., Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Inc.*, 638 F. Supp. 2d 632 (E.D. La. 2009) (declining to dismiss plaintiff's fraud claim in a putative class action suit where plaintiff alleged that defendants' representation that they maintained privacy policies and procedures was false because at the time they made the statements defendants had not yet adopted policies to protect customer information).

<sup>195</sup>Not all privacy policies will support breach of contract claims. *See*,

harm, a plaintiff may be able to state a claim.<sup>196</sup>

State law claims also may be framed as class action suits to try to force settlements, whether or not meritorious. For example, more than 150 class action suits were filed alleging violations of California's Song-Beverly Credit Card Act in the first six months of 2011 following the California Supreme Court's ruling earlier that year that collection of a person's zip code, without more, in connection with a credit card transaction, could constitute a privacy violation under California law.<sup>197</sup> The Act provides for statutory damages in cases where violations may be shown.

Where litigation is premised on a third party's privacy violation, rather than a direct violation by the defendant, or on a defendant's mere republication of material, the suit may be preempted by the Communications Decency Act.<sup>198</sup> The exemption, however, does not apply, among other things,

---

*e.g.*, *Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp.*, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs could not sue Northwest Airlines for breach of its privacy statement because the privacy policy did not give rise to a contract claim and they acknowledged that they had not read it). Even where actionable, a privacy policy may insulate a company from liability, rather than create exposure, if the practice at issue was adequately disclosed. *See, e.g.*, *Johnson v. Microsoft Corp.*, No. C06-0900RAJ, 2009 WL 1794400 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2009); *see generally supra* § 26.14 (analyzing privacy statements and how to draft them).

In *Johnson*, the court granted partial summary judgment for Microsoft on plaintiffs' breach of contract claim in a putative class action suit where plaintiffs had alleged that Microsoft breached its End User License Agreement (EULA), which prohibited Microsoft from transmitting "personally identifiable information" from the user's computer to Microsoft, by collecting IP addresses. The court held that the term, *personally identifiable information*, did not include IP addresses, which identify a computer rather than a person. In the words of the court, "[i]n order for 'personally identifiable information' to be personally identifiable, it must identify a person." *Johnson v. Microsoft Corp.*, No. C06-0900 RAJ, 2009 WL 1794400, at \*4 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2009).

<sup>196</sup>*See generally infra* § 27.07 (analyzing putative security breach class action suits).

<sup>197</sup>*See Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc.*, 51 Cal. 4th 524, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 531 (2011); Ian C. Ballon & Robert Herrington, Are Your Data Collection Practices Putting Your Company At Risk?, ABA Information Security & Privacy News (Autumn 2011); *see generally supra* § 26.13[6][E] (analyzing the case and underlying statute).

<sup>198</sup>*See* 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c); *see also, e.g.*, *Carafano v. Metroplash.com, Inc.*, 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding plaintiff's privacy claim preempted); *Collins v. Purdue University*, 703 F. Supp. 2d 862, 877-80 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (false light); *Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc.*, 540 F.

to the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act<sup>199</sup> “or any similar State law.”<sup>200</sup>

As noted earlier, many putative class action cases settle. Class action settlements typically are structured to provide payments and/or equitable relief, in addition to an award of attorneys’ fees to class counsel.<sup>201</sup> While certification of a liability class is usually fought by defendants, once a settlement is reached the parties typically jointly seek court approval for a settlement class, which maximizes the preclusive

---

Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008); *Parker v. Google, Inc.*, 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500–01 (E.D. Pa. 2006), *aff’d mem.*, 242 F. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2007), *cert. denied*, 552 U.S. 156 (2008); *Barrett v. Fonorow*, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1184, 279 Ill. Dec. 113, 799 N.E.2d 916 (2d Dist. 2003) (false light invasion of privacy and defamation); *see generally infra* § 37.05 (analyzing the CDA and discussing other cases).

<sup>199</sup>47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(4). The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510 *et seq.*, is discussed briefly in section 26.09 and more extensively in sections 44.06, 44.07 and 50.06[4] (and briefly in section 58.07[5][A]).

<sup>200</sup>47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(4).

<sup>201</sup>*See, e.g., Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.*, 638 F. App’x 594 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming approval of *cy pres* class action settlement); *Lane v. Facebook, Inc.*, 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012) (approving an attorneys’ fee award of \$2,364,973.58 and a \$9.5 million *cy pres* class action settlement in a suit over Facebook’s beacon program brought under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Video Privacy Protection Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and California Computer Crime Law (Cal. Penal Code § 502), and for remedies for unjust enrichment), *cert. denied*, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013); *In re Yahoo Mail Litigation*, No. 13-cv-4980-LHK, 2016 WL 4474612 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016) (granting final approval of a class action settlement); *Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp.*, Case No. 13-CV-04303-LHK, 2016 WL 613255 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (granting final approval of a class action settlement); *Berry v. Schulman*, 807 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2015) (affirming approval of a FCRA settlement class); *In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litigation*, 309 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (approving a settlement by a class of users who alleged that LinkedIn had failed to adequately protect user information for premium subscribers); *In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig.*, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval to a class action settlement relating to Google’s alleged disclosure of referer header information from search queries to third parties); *Kim v. Space Pencil, Inc.*, No. C 11-03796 LB, 2012 WL 5948951 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2012) (approving settlement of a suit alleging that Kissmetrics surreptitiously tracked plaintiffs’ web browsing activities, pursuant to which Kissmetrics had agreed not to use the browser cache, DOM (HTML 5) local storage, Adobe Flash LSOs or eTags to “respawn” or repopulate HTTP cookies and awarding plaintiffs \$474,195.49 in attorneys’ fees in addition to costs and incentive payments to the named plaintiffs).

effect of any settlement. Settlements and fee awards are subject to court approval.<sup>202</sup>

The volume of putative privacy class action suits filed since 2010 underscores that privacy suits, whether or not meritorious, may impose a significant cost on an Internet companies.

Businesses may limit their risk of exposure to class action litigation by users or customers where there is privity of contract by including binding arbitration provisions and class action waivers in consumer contracts. As analyzed at length in section 22.05[2][M], arbitration provisions (including those containing a prohibition on class-wide remedies) are generally enforceable in standard form consumer contracts, including Terms of Use, as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2011 decision in *AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion*<sup>203</sup> and subsequent case law. Class action waivers in contracts litigated in court, however, may or may not be enforceable, depending on the jurisdiction whose law is applied.<sup>204</sup>

Even without a class action waiver, if the court finds that there is a binding arbitration agreement, the entire case will be stayed and arbitration compelled—effectively preventing plaintiffs' counsel from even moving for class certification.<sup>205</sup> Judges, however, closely scrutinize unilateral contracts with consumers and will not enforce arbitration provisions if assent to the proposed agreement has been obtained<sup>206</sup> or if the agreement is unconscionable. A court, however, may not find an agreement unconscionable merely because it would deprive a plaintiff of the ability to seek class-wide relief.<sup>207</sup>

The law governing arbitration agreements and class ac-

---

<sup>202</sup>See *supra* § 25.07[2].

<sup>203</sup>*AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).

<sup>204</sup>See *supra* § 22.05[2][M].

<sup>205</sup>See, e.g., *In re RealNetworks, Inc. Privacy Litig.*, Civil No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (denying an intervenor's motion for class certification where the court found that RealNetworks had entered into a contract with putative class members that provided for binding arbitration); see *generally supra* § 22.05[2][M] (analyzing the issue and discussing more recent case law).

<sup>206</sup>See, e.g., *Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.*, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (declining to enforce an arbitration provision contained in posted terms accessible via a link and holding such terms to not be binding on users because assent was not obtained); see *generally supra* §§ 21.03 (analyzing online contract formation), 22.05[2][M] (arbitration provisions in unilateral consumer contracts).

<sup>207</sup>See *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); *supra*

tion waivers in unilateral contracts is analyzed in section 22.05[2][M] and chapter 56. How to draft an arbitration provision to maximize its enforceability is separately considered in section 22.05[2][M][vi].

Like patent troll and stock drop cases, data privacy suits may be viewed as a cost of doing business in today's digital economy. Whether and how a company responds to these suits may determine how many more get brought against it by class action lawyers down the road.

### 26.16 Privacy and Reverse Engineering

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act protects access control and copy protection mechanisms that protect digital works entitled to copyright protection.<sup>1</sup> Section 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(2) collectively are referred to as anti-trafficking provisions. Section 1201(b)(1) addresses trafficking in technologies that circumvent technical measures that prevent copying. Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits trafficking in technologies that circumvent technological measures that effectively control access to protected works. Section 1201(a)(1), in turn, prohibits the actual circumvention of access controls.

The DMCA, however, creates an exception where circumvention is undertaken to prevent the collection or dissemination of personally identifying information in connection with otherwise gaining lawful access to a work.<sup>2</sup>

The DMCA is addressed in greater detail in section 4.21.

---

§ 22.05[2][M].

[Section 26.16]

<sup>1</sup>See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201; *supra* § 4.21.

<sup>2</sup>17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(i).

# E-COMMERCE & INTERNET LAW: TREATISE WITH FORMS, 2D 2017

*Ian C. Ballon*

**NEW AND  
IMPORTANT  
FEATURES  
FOR 2017  
NOT FOUND  
ELSEWHERE**

**THE PREEMINENT  
INTERNET AND  
MOBILE LAW  
TREATISE FROM A  
LEADING INTERNET  
LITIGATOR – NOW A 5  
VOLUME SET!**



To order call **1-888-728-7677**  
or visit **[legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com](http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com)**

## TAKE YOUR INTERNET AND MOBILE PRACTICE TO THE NEXT LEVEL

E-Commerce & Internet Law is a comprehensive, authoritative work covering business-to-business and business-to-customer issues, regulatory issues, and emerging trends. It includes practice tips and forms, nearly 10,000 detailed footnotes, and references to hundreds of unpublished court decisions, many of which are not available elsewhere. Its unique organization facilitates finding quick answers to your questions.

The updated new edition offers an unparalleled reference and practical resource. Organized into five sectioned volumes, the 59 chapters cover:

- Sources of Internet Law and Practice
- Intellectual Property
- Licenses and Contracts
- Privacy, Security and Advertising
- The Conduct and Regulation of E-Commerce
- Internet Speech, Defamation, Online Torts and the Good Samaritan Exemption
- Obscenity, Pornography, Adult Entertainment and the Protection of Children
- Theft of Digital Information and Related Internet Crimes
- Liability of Internet Sites and Services (Including Social Networks and Blogs)
- Civil Jurisdiction and Litigation

### Distinguishing Features

- ◆ Clear, well written and with a practical perspective based on how issues actually play out in court (not available anywhere else)
- ◆ Exhaustive analysis of circuit splits and changes in the law combined with a common sense, practical approach for resolving legal issues, doing deals, documenting transactions and litigating and winning disputes
- ◆ Covers laws specific to the Internet and explains how the laws of the physical world apply to internet and mobile transactions and liability risks
- ◆ Addresses both law and best practices
- ◆ Comprehensive treatment of intellectual property, data privacy and mobile and Internet security breach law

### Key Features of E-Commerce & Internet Law

- ◆ Trends and circuit splits in security breach and data privacy class action suits and their impact on companies seeking to mitigate their risks
- ◆ The most comprehensive analysis of the TCPA's application to text messaging and its impact on litigation found anywhere (including a full explanation of potential inconsistencies in past FCC Orders governing what constitutes an ATDS)
- ◆ Complete analysis of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) and Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and their impact on screen scraping and database protection, cybersecurity information sharing and trade secret protection, privacy obligations and the impact that Terms of Use and other internet and mobile contracts may have in limiting the broad exemption from liability otherwise available under CISA
- ◆ The only treatise to provide comprehensive treatment of the secondary liability of Internet, mobile and cloud site owners and service providers for user content and misconduct under state and federal law
- ◆ Understanding the laws governing SEO and SEM and their impact on e-commerce vendors, including major developments involving internet advertising and sponsored link law
- ◆ Separating myth from reality in drafting Terms of Service agreements and Privacy Policies and understanding seemingly conflicting case law governing online and mobile contract formation, the enforcement of arbitration provisions and California and New Jersey consumer protection laws affecting TOUs
- ◆ Understanding copyright and Lanham Act fair use, patentable subject matter, right of publicity laws governing the use of celebrity images and attributes, initial interest confusion, software copyrightability, damages in internet and mobile cases, screen scraping and database protection, the use of icons in mobile marketing, and the applicability and scope of federal and state safe harbors and exemptions
- ◆ How to enforce judgments against foreign domain name registrants
- ◆ Valuing domain name registrations
- ◆ Compelling the disclosure of the identity of anonymous and pseudonymous tortfeasors and infringers
- ◆ Comprehensive, current and freshly revised analysis of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Communications Decency Act (including case law construing these statutes)
- ◆ An action-oriented, transactional approach to compliance with all U.S. state and territorial security breach notification laws
- ◆ Practical tips, checklists and forms that go beyond the typical legal treatise
- ◆ Clear, concise, and practical analysis

To order call **1-888-728-7677**  
or visit **[legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com](http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com)**

---

## Volume 1

---

### **Part I. Sources of Internet Law and Practice: A Framework for Developing New Law**

- Chapter* 1. Context for Developing the Law of the Internet  
2. A Framework for Developing New Law  
3. [Reserved]

### **Part II. Intellectual Property**

4. Copyright Protection in Cyberspace  
5. Database Protection and Screen Scraping  
6. Trademark, Service Mark, Trade Name and Trade Dress Protection in Cyberspace  
7. Rights in Internet Domain Names

---

## Volume 2

---

- Chapter* 8. Internet Patents  
9. Search Engine Marketing, Optimization and Related Indexing, Information Location Tools and Advertising Practices — Unique I.P. Issues  
10. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Cyberspace  
11. Employer Rights in the Creation and Protection of Internet-Related Intellectual Property  
12. Privacy and Publicity Rights of Celebrities and Others in Cyberspace  
13. Idea Protection and Misappropriation

### **Part III. Licenses and Contracts**

14. Documenting Internet Transactions: Introduction to Drafting License Agreements and Contracts  
15. Drafting Agreements in Light of Model and Uniform Contract Laws: UCITA, the UETA, Federal Legislation and the EU Distance Sales Directive  
16. Internet Licenses: Rights Subject to License and Limitations Imposed on Content, Access and Development  
17. Licensing Pre-Existing Content for Use Online: Music, Literary Works, Video, Software and User Generated Content Licensing Pre-Existing Content  
18. Drafting Internet Content and Development Licenses  
19. Website Development and Hosting Agreements  
20. Website Cross-Promotion and Cooperation: Co-Branding, Widget and Linking Agreements  
21. Obtaining Assent in Cyberspace: Contract Formation for Click-Through and Other Unilateral Contracts  
22. Structuring and Drafting Website Terms and Conditions  
23. ISP Service Agreements

---

## Volume 3

---

- Chapter* 24. Software as a Service: On-Demand, Rental and Application Service Provider Agreements

### **Part IV. Privacy, Security and Internet Advertising**

25. Introduction to Consumer Protection in Cyberspace  
26. Data Privacy  
27. Internet, Network and Data Security  
28. Advertising in Cyberspace

---

## Volume 4

---

- Chapter* 29. Email and Text Marketing, Spam and the Law of Unsolicited Commercial Email and Text Messaging  
30. Online Gambling

### **Part V. The Conduct and Regulation of Internet Commerce**

31. Online Financial Transactions and Payment Mechanisms  
32. Online Securities Law  
33. Taxation of Electronic Commerce  
34. Antitrust Restrictions on Technology Companies and Electronic Commerce  
35. State and Local Regulation of the Internet  
36. Best Practices for U.S. Companies in Evaluating Global E-Commerce Regulations and Operating Internationally

### **Part VI. Internet Speech, Defamation, Online Torts and the Good Samaritan Exemption**

37. Defamation, Torts and the Good Samaritan Exemption (47 U.S.C.A. § 230)  
38. Tort and Related Liability for Hacking, Cracking, Computer Viruses, Disabling Devices and Other Network Disruptions  
39. E-Commerce and the Rights of Free Speech, Press and Expression In Cyberspace

### **Part VII. Obscenity, Pornography, Adult Entertainment and the Protection of Children**

40. Child Pornography and Obscenity  
41. Laws Regulating Non-Obscene Adult Content Directed at Children  
42. U.S. Jurisdiction, Venue and Procedure in Obscenity and Other Internet Crime Cases

### **Part VIII. Theft of Digital Information and Related Internet Crimes**

43. Detecting and Retrieving Stolen Corporate Data  
44. Criminal and Related Civil Remedies for Software and Digital Information Theft  
45. Crimes Directed at Computer Networks and Users: Viruses and Malicious Code, Service Disabling Attacks and Threats Transmitted by Email

---

## Volume 5

---

- Chapter* 46. Identity Theft  
47. Civil Remedies for Unlawful Seizures

### **Part IX. Liability of Internet Sites and Service (Including Social Networks and Blogs)**

48. Assessing and Limiting Liability Through Policies, Procedures and Website Audits  
49. Website Owner, Cloud Storage, and Service Provider Liability for User Generated Content and Misconduct  
50. Strategies for Managing Third-Party Liability Risks From User Content and Misconduct for Different Types of Website and Cloud Owners, Operators and Service Providers  
51. Web 2.0 Applications: Social Networks, Blogs, Wiki and UGC Sites

### **Part X. Civil Jurisdiction and Litigation**

52. General Overview of Cyberspace Jurisdiction  
53. Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace  
54. Venue and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens  
55. Choice of Law in Cyberspace  
56. Internet ADR  
57. Internet Litigation Strategy and Practice  
58. Electronic Business and Social Network Communications in the Workplace, in Litigation and in Corporate and Employer Policies  
59. Use of Email in Attorney-Client Communications

*“Should be on the desk of every lawyer who deals with cutting edge legal issues involving computers or the Internet.”*

**Jay Monahan**

**General Counsel, ResearchGate**

\*\*\*\*\*

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

\*\*\*\*\*

### IAN C. BALLON

Ian Ballon is Co-Chair of Greenberg Traurig LLP's Global Intellectual Property and Technology Practice Group and is a litigator based in the firm's Silicon Valley and Los Angeles offices. He defends data privacy, security breach, TCPA, and other Internet and mobile class action suits and litigates copyright, trademark, patent, trade secret, right of publicity, database and other intellectual property suits, including disputes involving Internet-related safe harbors and exemptions.



Mr. Ballon was the recipient of the 2010 Vanguard Award from the State Bar of California's Intellectual Property Law Section. He also has been recognized by *The Los Angeles and San Francisco Daily Journal* as one of the Top 75 Intellectual Property litigators and Top 100 lawyers in California.

Mr. Ballon was named as the Lawyer of the Year for information technology law in the 2016 and 2013 editions of *The Best Lawyers in America* and is listed in Legal 500 U.S., The Best Lawyers in America (in the areas of information technology and intellectual property) and Chambers and Partners USA Guide in the areas of privacy and data security and information technology. He also serves as Executive Director of Stanford University Law School's Center for E-Commerce in Palo Alto.

Mr. Ballon received his B.A. *magna cum laude* from Tufts University, his J.D. *with honors* from George Washington University Law School and an LLM in international and comparative law from Georgetown University Law Center. He also holds the C.I.P.P./U.S. certification from the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP).

In addition to *E-Commerce and Internet Law: Treatise with Forms 2d edition*, Mr. Ballon is the author of *The Complete CAN-SPAM Act Handbook* (West 2008) and *The Complete State Security Breach Notification Compliance Handbook* (West 2009), published by Thomson West ([www.IanBallon.net](http://www.IanBallon.net)).

He may be contacted at [BALLON@GTLAW.COM](mailto:BALLON@GTLAW.COM) and followed on Google+, Twitter and LinkedIn (@IanBallon).

**Contributing authors:** Parry Aftab, Ed Chansky, Francoise Gilbert, Tucker McCrady, Josh Raskin, Tom Smedinghoff and Emilio Varanini.

## NEW AND IMPORTANT FEATURES FOR 2017

- > Understanding the 9th circuit's "duty to warn" exception to the CDA and the interplay between the CDA, Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), Cyberspace Information Security Act (CISA) and FREE SPEECH Act
- > Comparing "but for" and proximate cause analysis under the CDA and DMCA
- > The most extensive and sophisticated analysis of standing in security breach cases available anywhere – explaining circuit splits and trends in the law that would not be apparent if you merely lined up the leading cases and tried to distinguish them based on their facts
- > A complete analysis of the new federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, including areas where state trade secret laws may provide greater remedies
- > An exhaustive look at the DMCA, its legislative history and case law construing it
- > New liability exemptions for service providers and others under the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act and Defend Trade Secrets Act
- > ECPA limitations on the discovery in civil litigation of the contents of internet, mobile and social media communications, both in the U.S. and overseas
- > Innovative, transactional analysis of state security breach notification laws, security breach class action suits and standing in security breach, data privacy and TCPA litigation
- > Exhaustive analysis of case law, trends and circuit splits under the VPPA, TCPA, ECPA, CFAA and other federal statutes governing internet and mobile communications
- > The extent to which sponsored link and Lanham Act case law may impact a website's own search practices
- > New strategies for database protection and ethical screen scraping
- > Understanding the new US-EU Privacy Shield (by Francoise Gilbert)
- > Updated analysis of state security breach laws in the 48 states that have them (including new California laws) and in D.C., Puerto Rico and Guam—analyzed holistically the way a practitioner would, rather than merely by chart or graph
- > Mobile, Internet and Social Media contests and promotions (updated by Ed Chansky)
- > Evaluating the trade-off between civil and criminal remedies when both are available for information theft
- > Compelling the disclosure of the identity of anonymous and pseudonymous infringers and tortfeasors, consistent with ECPA and state privacy laws
- > Conducting a risk assessment and creating a Written Information Security Assessment Plan (WISP) (by Thomas J. Smedinghoff)

**SAVE 20% NOW!!**

To order call **1-888-728-7677**  
or visit [legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com](http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com),  
enter promo code **WPD20** at checkout

List Price: \$2,054.00  
Discounted Price: \$1,643.20